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Coreen S. Arnold* and Ralph J Rohner**
I. INTRODUCTION
The great volatility of interest rates over the past several years led Con-
gress to enact legislation to increase the flow of credit and to enhance com-
petition among lending institutions. One of these enactments, the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 19801
(DIDMCA or the Act), includes measures such as federal preemption of
state usury ceilings for business and agricultural credit,' and for residential
first mortgages.' Another portion of the Act' seeks to create a more "level
playing field" 5 among financial institutions by according to all federally
insured lenders-banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions-
a preferential rate policy comparable to that enjoyed for over a century by
national (i e., federally chartered) banks.
The heart of this longstanding advantage for national banks is the so-
* Senior Compliance Examiner, Office of Customer & Community Programs, Comp-
troller of the Currency, and senior student at The Catholic University of America School of
Law. B.B.A. (1974), The University of Iowa. None of the views expressed herein are attrib-
utable to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
** Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America School of Law. B.A. (1960),
J.D. (1963), The Catholic University of America. The authors express their appreciation for
helpful comments on this article to William M. Burke, Esq., of the California bar; Joseph R.
Crouse, Esq., Maryland Commissioner of Banks; Alan S. Kaplinsky, Esq., of the Penn-
sylvania bar; Timothy D. Marrinan, Esq., of the Minnesota bar; and Peter D. Schellie, Esq.,
of the District of Columbia and Indiana bars.
1. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 161 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as
DIDMCA].
2. DIDMCA, supra note 1, §§ 511-512-(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 86a (Supp. IV 1980)).
3. Id. § 501 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (Supp. IV 1980)).
4. Id. §§ 521-523, 525 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 183 Id, 1730g (Supp. IV 1980)).
5. This language appears frequently to describe the intended purpose of this portion of
DIDMCA. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. S3164 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1980).
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called "most favored lender" doctrine. Derived from case law and federal
agency interpretations of language in the National Bank Act of 1864,6 the
doctrine holds that a national bank may charge the highest rate that any
other lender in a state may charge for the same type of transaction, regard-
less of state usury limits which otherwise would be applicable to national
banks. DIDMCA extended language parallel to provisions in the National
Bank Act to federally insured state banks and other federally insured de-
pository institutions, and has been construed to accord most favored
lender status to those institutions.
The legislative history for the DIDMCA amendments is sparse, and
agency interpretations have barely begun to explore the possible nuances
of a rule that allows one lender to borrow the rate structure authorized for
other lenders. Opinions on these issues under the older National Bank Act
are limited, and there is little definitive judicial construction of the
DIDMCA amendments. Meanwhile, several bills are pending which
would completely preempt state usury laws for all consumer credit transac-
tions, thus rendering moot many questions about of the scope of the most
favored lender doctrine. But the enactment of such preemptive legislation
is speculative, and until it becomes law, the boundaries of most favored
lender status for federally chartered and insured institutions will command
the careful attention of creditors and debtors, courts, and federal and state
supervisory agencies. This article offers some background and preliminary
analysis of these issues.
II. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
On March 31, 1980, President Carter signed into law the Depository In-
stitutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. Title V of the
Act contains three parts which override state usury laws.7 Part C, sections
521-523, contains language which amends various federal statutes, grant-
6. Ch. 106, § 30, 13 Stat. 108 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 85 (Supp. IV 1980)).
7. Section 501 of DIDMCA (codified at § 1735f-7 (Supp. IV 1980)) provides a plenary
preemption of state usury laws applicable to first-lien residential mortgages, subject to a
state's positive action to reimpose state ceilings before April 1, 1983. Part B, §§ 511-512, is
actually an extension of prior legislation which authorizes any lender, in a business or agri-
cultural loan transaction, to charge up to 5% over the Federal Reserve Discount rate on 90-
day commercial paper. This preemption, too, is subject to state override anytime after April
1, 1980. Part C, §§ 521-523, discussed throughout this article, applies to all credit extensions
by federally insured depository institutions. It authorizes two rate ceiling options for such
lenders, beyond the rate limit otherwise applicable to such institutions under state law.
DIDMCA, in its entirety, was an omnibus (or "Christmas tree") banking bill which, inter
a/ia, expanded requirements for maintaining bank reserves in the Federal Reserve System,
provided for the phased abolition of controls on rates paid to savers (the "Regulation Q
phase-out"), authorized a wide array of customer services by banks and other financial insti-
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ing special interest rate privileges to federally insured depository institu-
tions.8 Each of these provisions states that, instead of the rate ceiling
normally applicable, the institution may charge interest either at a rate of
1% over the Federal Reserve discount rate, or "at the rate allowed by the
laws of the State. . . where the finstitution] is located, whichever may be
greater." (emphasis added).
tutions, and simplified the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 to 1681 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980).
8. Section 521 amends the Federal Deposit Insurance Act by adding a new § 27 (codi-
fied at 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (Supp. IV 1980)), which reads in pertinent part as follows:
(a) In order to prevent discrimination against State-chartered insured banks in-
cluding insured savings banks, and insured mutual savings banks, or insured
branches of foreign banks with respect to interest rates, if the applicable rate pre-
scribed in this subsection exceeds the rate such State bank or insured branch of a
foreign bank would be permitted to charge in the absence of this subsection, such
State bank or such insured branch of a foreign bank may, notwithstanding any
State constitution or statute which is hereby preempted for the purposes of this
section, take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made, or upon
any note, bill of exchange, or other evidence of debt, interest at a rate of not more
than I per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in
effect at the Federal Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve district where such State
bank or such insured branch of a foreign bank is located or at the rate allowed by
the laws of the State, territory, or district where the bank is located, whichever may
be greater.
12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
Section 522 amends Title IV of the National Housing Act by adding a new § 414 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1730g), which reads in pertinent part as follows:
(a) If the applicable rate prescribed in this section exceeds the rate an insured
institution would bepermitted to charge in the absence of this section, such institu-
tion may, notwithstanding any State constitution or statute which is hereby pre-
empted for the purposes of this section, take, receive, reserve, and charge on any
loan or discount made, or upon any note, bill of exchange, or other evidence of
debt, interest at a rate of not more than I per centum in excess of the discount rate
on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve bank in the Fed-
eral Reserve district where such institution is located or at the rate allowed by the
laws of the State, territory, or district where such institution is located, whichever
may be greater.
12 U.S.C. § 1730g(a) (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
Section 523 amends the Federal Credit Union Act by adding a new § 205g (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1785 (Supp. IV 1980)), which reads in pertinent part as follows:
(1) If the applicable rate prescribed in this subsection exceeds the rate an insured
credit union would be permitted to charge in the absence of this subsection, such
credit union may, notwithstanding any State constitution or statute which is hereby
preempted for the purposes of this subsection, take, receive, reserve, and charge on
any loan, interest at a rate of not more 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate
on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve bank in the Fed-
eral Reserve district where such insured credit union is located or at the rate al-
lowed by the laws of the State, territory, or district where such credit union is
located, whichever may be greater.
12 U.S.C. § 1785g (Supp. IV 1980).
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Since the clear congressional purpose was to provide other lenders with
the same interest rate advantage as national banks,9 the implications of
this legislation can be analyzed by comparison with similar statutory lan-
guage in the National Bank Act and its interpretation by the courts. The
legislative history of DIDMCA and interpretations by those agencies
charged with its enforcement also provide some guidance, although virtu-
ally all of the congressional debate has centered on the "1% in excess of the
discount rate" option and not on the "rate allowed by the laws of the
State" language.' 0 The DIDMCA legislative debate offers no explicit
mention of the "most favored lender" doctrine as that phrase has been
used in case law under the National Bank Act."
9. During Senate consideration of the conference report on H.R. 4986 (the bill that
became DIDMCA), the chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, Senator Proxmire, de-
scribed DIDMCA, Title V, as containing "a provision which provides parity, or competitive
equality, between national banks and state chartered depository institutions on lending lim-
its." 126 CONG. REC. S3170 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1980).
The implications of this legislation in terms of market shares are significant. Of the $318
billion in nonmortgage consumer installment and revolving credit outstanding in June 1981,
commercial banks held $143 billion, or about 45% (more than half of this held by national
banks), savings and loan associations held $11 billion (3 1/2%), and credit unions $46 billion
(14%). 67 Fed. Res. Bull. A40 (Aug. 1981). Not all of these financial institutions are feder-
ally insured, but the number relying on state deposit insurance is small.
10. See §§ 521-523, supra note 8. Congress focused exclusively on the first option, and
seemed utterly unaware of, or unconcerned with, the case law discussed throughout this
article. Since the "most favored lender" doctrine for national banks is almost wholly a crea-
ture of case law, the extension of that doctrine to lenders other than national banks really
has no legislative history, and hangs on the slender thread of language in §§ 521-523 which
is parallel to the language of § 85 of Title 12 of the United States Code.
The origin of DIDMCA §§ 521-523 is instructive of the perceived purpose of those sec-
tions. These provisions appeared nowhere in the original bills that were growing into the
omnibus bill that became DIDMCA. In late 1979, during Senate consideration of the
House-passed bill, H.R. 4986, the two senators from Arkansas voiced special concern for the
plight of Arkansas state banks which, like all lenders in that state, were restricted by the state
constitution to a 10% simple-interest rate ceiling on all credit extensions. 125 CONG. REC.
S 15,684 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1979) (remarks of Senators Bumpers and Pryor). Those senators
subsequently introduced a bill, S. 1988, on which the Senate Banking Committee held hear-
ings in December 1979. Hearings on S. 1988 Before the Senate ComL on Banking, Housing
and Urban 4ffairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). A companion bill was introduced in the
House, also sponsored by an Arkansas representative. H.R. 6503, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). These bills were essentially the same as the present language of §§ 521-523, but
neither bill was ever reported out of committee. Yet during the course of the subsequent
conference consideration of H.R. 4986, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), the provisions of the
"Arkansas bill" were negotiated into the finished package.
The lack of any congressional discussion of the most favored lender case law is therefore
somewhat understandable. In Arkansas, no lender could charge more than 10% simple in-
terest, and so the legislative push was toward authorizing state banks to charge 1% over the
Federal Reserve discount rate. This was the only option that would provide any real rate
relief to Arkansas lenders.
11. There are at most some fleeting references to the most favored lender doctrine in
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Section 85 of Title 12 of the United States Code [hereinafter section
851,12 provides the same options as sections 521-523 of DIDMCA, ie., na-
tional banks may charge either 1% over the Federal Reserve discount rate,
or "at the rate allowed by the laws of the state." In addition, an "except"
clause adds a third alternative for national banks (an alternative not repli-
cated in DIDMCA) providing that national banks may in any case charge
the rate "limited" for state banks.
I The language of section 85 is unclear, and therefore susceptible of sev-
eral constructions. One reasonable interpretation of this section could be
written statements submitted during the hearings on S. 1988. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1988
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 64-65
(1979) (statement of Joseph N. Cugini (Credit Union National Association)). What is sur-
prising is that the Comptroller of the Currency, who certainly knew of the most favored
lender case law affecting national banks, submitted an extensive statement for the hearing
record, but did not even hint at the existence of the doctrine. Id. at 19-22.
In fact, through the entire debate over the preemption provisions in Title V of DIDMCA,
Congress evidenced considerable ignorance about the exact scope of the favoritism for na-
tional banks under § 85. When Senator Cochran proposed an amendment to H.R. 4986 to
preempt, state usury laws for business and agricultural loans, the following exchange
occurred:
Mr. COCHRAN. . . . There are about 18 States, I am advised, who do have
restrictions under statutory law which have the effect of prohibiting State banks
from making loans at the going rate of interest or at the rate at which national
banks in those States can make such loans.
Mr. MORGAN. Is it the Senator's understanding that the national banks ought
not to be bound by the state usury laws?
Mr. COCHRAN. My understanding is that the Federal laws governing the op-
eration of national banks do have precedence. Someone who is more familiar with
the legal effect of the Federal law in that regard may be better qualified to answer
that question. I am advised that because of the disparity in the law national banks
do in fact have a different set of rules under which to operate.
Mr. MORGAN. The Senator may be quite correct. During the last few years
we must have preempted or changed State laws a thousand times. It is my under-
standing, however, that national banks are bound by State usury laws ...
125 CoNG. REC. S15,260 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1979). Apparently no one ever clarified the
senators' uncertainty.
12. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (Supp. IV 1980) (originally enacted as § 30 of the National Bank Act,
ch. 106, § 30, 13 Stat. 108 (1864), as amended by ch. 89, § 25, 48 Stat. 191 (1933)). It now
provides in pertinent part:
Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount
made, or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt, interest at
the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bank is
located, or at a rate of I per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day
commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve Bank in the Federal Reserve
district where the bank is located, whichever may be the greater, and no more,
except that where by the laws of any State a dfferent rate is limited for banks
organized under State laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for associations
organized or existing in any such State under this chapter.
Id. (emphasis added).
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that national banks are not limited to charging the interest rate generally
permitted under the laws of the state where they are located, but instead
may charge the rates that are allowed for state banks, if those rates are
more favorable. However, the courts and the agency charged with en-
forcement of the National Bank Act, the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), have long inferred a different, and broader, meaning from the
words of section 85.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that section 85 is an enabling
statute which empowers national banks to charge interest at the highest
rates permitted other lenders by the laws of the state in which the bank is
located. As early as 1874, in Tfany v. National Bank of Missouri,'3 the
Court declared that the original statute gave advantages to national banks
over their state competitors by allowing national banks to charge interest
in excess of what state banks could charge, if the state law permitted some
lenders to charge more. National banks could charge the rates available to
the "most favored lender"14 in the state in order to assure that state legisla-
tures would be unable to bind national banks to lower rates applicable to
state chartered institutions. The basic holding in Tiffany, which has never
been modified, 15 underlies an OCC interpretation of section 85,16 origi-
nally issued as an opinion letter in 1936 and later adopted as a formal
ruling, which confirms that national banks may charge the highest rate
13. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1874). The Court held that a national bank could lawfully
charge 9% on a loan since Missouri law allowed a rate of 10% to lenders generally, even
though that state's law limited state banks to a rate of 8%.
14. This phrase, now universally used to describe the effect of§ 85, grew from language
in Tifany: "National banks have been national favorites." Id. at 413. This favoritism
flowed from the purposes for creating a system of nationally chartered banks: to provide a
stable currency base by driving state bank notes out of circulation, and to create a structure
of financial institutions suitable for financing government expenditures in the Civil War.
For the setting and history of the creation of the national banking system, see generally R.
TIMBERLAKE, JR., THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES (1978); Da-
vis, The National Banking System, V PUBLICATIONS OF THE NAT'L MONETARY COMM'N
(1911).
15. The Supreme Court signaled its continuing approval of Tiffany as recently as 1978
in Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978). See notes 122-
41 and accompanying text infra.
16. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7310 (1980). The interpretive ruling provides in pertinent part:
A national bank may charge interest at the maximum rate permitted by State law
to any competing State-chartered or licensed lending institution. If State law per-
mits a higher interest rate on a specified class of loans, a national bank making
such loans at such higher rate is subject only to the provisions of State law relating
to such class of loans that are material to the determination of the interest rate. For
example, a national bank may lawfully charge the highest rate permitted to be
charged by a State-licensed small loan company or morris plan bank, without be-
ing so licensed.
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permitted any other lender on specific types of loans. It was not until 1933
that the National Bank Act was amended to allow national banks the addi-
tional option of charging 1% above the federal discount rate for ninety-day
commercial paper.1
7
As a practical matter, national banks have not had to rely on the author-
ity of the OCC interpretive ruling often. Reasonably generous state usury
laws, competitive pressures, and the inability of corporate borrowers to
assert usury defenses, as well as the traditional reluctance of banks to en-
gage in high-risk (high rate) consumer lending have rendered most favored
lender rights claims largely unnecessary. There was little use of the 1%
above discount option until the mortgage crunch of 1979.18 But where
states permitted high rates (even above the discount rate) to certain credi-
tors, such as small loan companies and retail stores, national banks have
used their protected status as favored lenders to charge rates "borrowed"
from those state laws.' 9
As a third possible interpretation of section 85, where state banks are
limited to an interest rate different than the rate allowed to lenders gener-
ally, national banks are also limited to the rate for state banks. In a recent
state probate court case,20 the estate administrator argued for such an in-
terpretation, but the court rejected that argument, attributing the following
meaning to the "except" clause of section 85:
the words 'a different rate' means 'a higher rate,' and was inserted
by the Congress to take care of the situation wherein state banks
might have been allowed, through special statutory exceptions, to
charge a higher rate, and thus ensure that national banks might
also charge the higher rate . . . . 12 U.S.C. § 85 has been con-
sistently interpreted as permitting national banks to charge as
much as state chartered banks or any other state licensed lenders;
17. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 25, 48 Stat. 191 (1933).
18. See, e.g., Kimball v. National Bank of North America, 468 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D.
N.Y.), afd without opinion, 614 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1979).
19. Recent court decisions have cited the OCC interpretive ruling, see note 16, supra,
with approval in permitting national banks to charge small loan company rates for open-end
credit card accounts above the rates specified under state law for that type of account.
Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 538 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1976); United Missouri Bank
of Kansas City v. Danforth, 394 F. Supp. 774 (W.D. Mo. 1975). In Northway Lanes v.
Hackley Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 464 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1972), the court deferred to
the OCC interpretive ruling and found support in the Tiffany decision and the legislative
history of the National Bank Act, to hold that national banks could charge closing costs not
allowed to banks but permitted to savings and loan associations under state law.
20. First Nat'l Bank of Kansas City v. Estate of Ward, (Est. No. 121,864, P. Ct. of
Jackson County, Mo., Jan. 20, 1976), reprinted in 93 BANKING L.J. 593 (1976). See also
State Nat'l Bank of Conn. v. Cohen, 32 Conn. Supp. 245, 349 A.2d 729 (1975).
1981]
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• . . national banks were placed on a parity with 'the most fa-
vored lender.' z'
Despite its convoluted language, section 85 continues to be interpreted by
the courts as it was in T#fany---that national banks are on a par with the
most favored lender in the state. And, upon comparison, the language in
DIDMCA closely tracks that in section 85.
Each of the agencies charged with enforcing DIDMCA has interpreted
the provisions of that Act to extend the most favored lender doctrine to
federally insured depository institutions that are not national banks. The
General Counsel of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
has unofficially construed section 521 of DIDMCA to grant most favored
lender status to federally insured state banks, based on the literal construc-
tion and congressional purpose of the amendment to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act. 2 In the language of section 521, Congress made explicit its
intent "to prevent discrimination against [insured state banks] with respect
to interest rates." 23 The Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, a
sponsor of DIDMCA, expressed a similar intent: "Title V. . . contains a
provision which provides parity, or competitive equality, between national
banks and State chartered depository institutions on lending limits ....
State chartered depository institutions are given the benefits of 12 U.S.C.
§ 85.,,24 The FDIC staff letter concluded that, by using the same language
as that used in section 85, Congress intended DIDMCA to have the same
meaning. Since the Supreme Court has interpreted the section 85 phrase
"the rate allowed by the laws of the state" to mean "the rate of interest
fixed by state laws for lenders generally, '2' and the phrase was later inter-
preted to mean the rate allowed to any lender in the state, 6 the FDIC
assumed an equally broad construction for state banks.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) has also issued an inter-
pretive ruling for section 522 of DIDMCA, which "formally endorses the
'most favored lender' concept as a matter of Board policy."27 The
21. 93 BANKING L.J. at 596.
22. FDIC Interpretive Letter from Frank L. Skillern, General Counsel (undated). This
opinion was apparently issued in early 1981. See Wash. Cred. Letter (Feb. 2, 1981).
It is important to appreciate that this letter, like many of the agency staff opinions cited
and discussed infra, has limited authoritative value. These letters are at best informal
agency staff advice and are not binding on courts. None of these opinion letters has the
same binding force as, for example, Federal Reserve Board staff letters interpreting the
Truth in Lending Act, under Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milholiin, 444 U.S. 555 (1980).
23. See note 8 supra.
24. 126 CONG. REC. S3170 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire) as
quoted in FDIC Interpretive Letter, supra note 22.
25. Tiffany v. National Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 411.
26. OCC Interpretive Ruling, supra note 16.
27. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,987 (1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 570.11).
[Vol. 3 1:1
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FHLBB, like the FDIC, focused on the similarity of language in
DIDMCA and in section 85, the interpretive history of the phrase "the rate
allowed by the laws of the State," and the intent of Congress as expressed
in the legislative history of the Act. The FHLBB's position is that since
Congress, in enacting DIDMCA, intended to give to other federally in-
sured lenders the same advantages as national banks, the use of language
identical to that found in the National Bank Act clearly extends most fa-
vored lender status to all federally insured savings and loan associations. 28
The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) has likewise issued
a statement of interpretation and policy 29 concerning section 523 of
DIDMCA. NCUA recognized that one reading of the statutory language
in DIDMCA would be that the "rate allowed" was the same as the "rate
[otherwise] permitted," thus limiting the credit union to the rate it could
normally charge under state law. 30 The agency determined, however, that
the words "rate allowed" contemplated higher rates available to other
lenders, and therefore should be interpreted to grant most favored lender
status to state chartered federally insured credit unions. This interpreta-
tion, according to NCUA, was consistent with previous interpretations of
the National Bank Act as well as the intent of DIDMCA to "remove the
competitive advantage National banks have."'"
Despite the similarities between the language of section 85 of the Na-
tional Bank Act and sections 521-523 of DIDMCA, the 1980 Act contains
an important difference. The apparent expansion of the most favored
lender doctrine under DIDMCA was not an absolute displacement of state
28. Id. at 13,988. Interestingly, while § 521 (applicable to state chartered banks) specifi-
cally states that it is designed to "prevent discrimination" against those institutions, there is
no comparable language in § 522 (for savings and loan associations) or § 523 (for credit
unions).
29. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,153 (1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 741). The NCUA interpre-
tation applies only to state chartered (but federally insured) credit unions, apparently be-
cause federally chartered credit unions are subject to an explicit federal interest rate ceiling.
30. 45 Fed. Reg. 78,624-25 (1980). NCUA's original interpretation stated that under
§ 523 of DIDMCA, most favored lender status was triggered when the rate credit unions
could charge was less that 1% above the discount rate, and applied only when a credit union
granted loans other than first mortgages, or business or agricultural loans of $1,000 or more.
Later NCUA cancelled that interpetation (IRPS 80-11) and adopted another (IRPS 81-3)
which eliminated the trigger mechanism and opined that most favored lender status applied
to any loan granted by a state-chartered and federally-insured credit union. 46 Fed. Reg.
24,153 (1981).
31. 45 Fed. Reg. 78,624-25 (1980). See also 126 CONG. REC. S3177 (daily ed. Mar. 27,
1980) (remarks of Sen. Bumpers). Note that the NCUA interpretation applies only to state
chartered credit unions. If correct, the interpretation creates a curious inconsistency: state
chartered credit unions are placed on a competitive level with national banks, but federally
chartered credit unions do not enjoy the same privilege and must operate under whatever
rates Congress expressly authorizes for them.
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usury laws. Section 525 provides that after April 1, 1980, a state may elect
not to have the amendments contained in sections 521-523 apply. 2 State
"override," either by passage of a law or by vote of the people, would
restore all federally insured institutions (except national banks) to their
previous position under state usury laws, that is, a position where they are
allowed to charge only the rates permitted to such lenders under state law.
By September 1981, three states 3  had acted to override the most favored
lender provisions of DIDMCA, and more states may be inclined to take
the same course, especially once the implications of the federal statute are
understood. For example, the NCUA has cautioned state chartered feder-
ally insured credit unions to contact their state supervisory agency to deter-
mine whether their most favored lender status has been superseded before
granting loans at such favorable rates.34 An anomalous feature of these
state override provisions, of course, is that none of them affect section 85 of
the National Bank Act, which has been in force for more than a century.
So while DIDMCA was intended to raise state chartered and other feder-
ally chartered institutions to a position of "competitive equality" with na-
tional banks, state legislatures are free to restore to national banks their
prior competitive advantage.
No federal court has yet addressed the question whether DIDMCA ac-
tually does grant other federally insured institutions the same broad most
favored lender status that national banks enjoy. In what may become a
32. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 525, 94 Stat. 164 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1730g (Supp. IV
1980)):
The amendments made by sections 521 through 523 of this title shall apply only
with respect to loans made in any State during the period beginning on April 1,
1980, and ending on the date, on or after April 1, 1980, on which such State adopts
a law or certifies that the voters of such State have voted in favor of any provision,
constitutional or otherwise, which states explicitly and by its terms that such State
does not want the amendments made by such section to apply with respect to loans
made in such State, except that such amendments shall apply to a loan made on or
after the date such law is adopted or such certification is made if such loan is made
pursuant to a commitment to make such loan which was entered into on or after
April 1, 1980, and prior to the date on which such law is adopted or such certifica-
tion is made.
33. 1980 Colo. Sess. Laws, H.B. 1178; 1981 Iowa Acts, ch. 1156; 1981 Mass. Acts, ch.
231.
Some states have enacted "little most favored lender" statutes of their own, permitting
state lenders to charge the same rates authorized for national banks. See, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 31:1-1.1 (Supp. 1981). This obviously permits state banks to use the 1% over dis-
count option, and it also apparently would permit a state bank to use a small loan rate if
national banks could use it under § 85. Where states have such statutes, an override of the
DIDMCA preemption provisions does not necessarily undo the competitive equality which
is DIDMCA's goal.
34. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,153-54 (1981).
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major test case, however, a state trial court in Maryland has declared that
"under [DIDMCA], state banks now have most favored lender status."35
In its memorandum opinion in Equitable Trust Co. v. Sachs, the court
stated:
[DIDMCA's] language. . . is the same as § 85's, and absent evi-
dence to the contrary, words taken from prior legislation must be
given the same meaning particularly where the provision con-
taining those words is part of a statute that is merely a continua-
tion of earlier legislative schemes.36
The court went on to affirm that, under DIDMCA, state chartered banks
can charge the rates authorized by the Maryland Consumer Loan Law.3
Given Congress' choice of language in DIDMCA, the consistent interpre-
tation of parallel language in section 85 of the National Bank Act, and
Congress' clear desire to equalize the rate structures available to national
banks and other lenders, it appears unlikely that any appellate court--state
or federal-would reach a result contrary to Equitable Trust Co.
Thus, the interpretations of the section 85 phrase "rate allowed by the
laws of the state" support the general conclusion that national banks may
charge the same interest rates allowed to the most favored lender in a state.
For example, a national bank may charge interest on an installment loan
at the higher rates permitted tinder that state's law for small loan compa-
nies, even though that rate is prohibited for state banks or other lenders
making similar loans. From a review of interpretations of DIDMCA by
federal agencies and the limited judicial interpretation of the statutory lan-
35. Equitable Trust Co. v. Sachs, A-60063/120-1/ Fol. 713 (Cir. Ct. of Baltimore City,
Md., Jan. 28, 1981). The plaintiffs were six Maryland banks (state and national) who sought
declaratory relief to permit them to charge annual membership fees as part of their credit
card plans, as well as interest at the highest rate allowed any state lender under the Mary-
land Consumer Loan Law. The banks also sought a declaration allowing them to charge the
most favored rate by complying only with certain provisions of the law determining interest
rates (amount of the loan, collateral requirements, and method of repayment). The court
held that the membership fee was a permissible charge for banks since it was not defined by
state law as interest or a finance charge. Under the most favored lender doctrine of both
§ 85 and DIDMCA, however, banks could charge the Maryland Consumer Loan Law rates
on credit card accounts only by complying with those provisions of that law material to a
determination of the interest rate.
The court has issued two opinions: the first, dated January 28, 1981, granted partial sum-
mary judgment to the plaintiff banks, holding in part that the most favored lender doctrine
under DIDMCA applies to the Maryland Consumer Loan Law; the second, dated Septem-
ber 16, 1981, ruled on a number of specific questions concerning the applicability of state
law provisions under the most favored lender doctrine. For ease of reference, these opinions
are designated "slip op. no. 1" and "slip op. no. 2," respectively.
36. Id. slip op. no. 1, at 36-37 (citation omitted). Accord, Opinion of the Michigan
Attorney General, No. 5894, 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 97,134 (1981).
37. Equitable Trust Co. v. Sachs, supra note 35, slip op. no. 1 at 36.
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guage, it appears that the same most favored lender doctrine has been ex-
tended to all other federally insured depository institutions. Thus, a
federally insured state bank, savings and loan association, or state
chartered credit union may also charge the higher small loan company
rate, even though state law does not permit such a favorable rate for credi-
tors generally.
III. THE "RATE ALLOWED BY THE LAWS OF THE STATE"
The recent congressional enactment of DIDMCA means that the tiered,
or structured, rate laws within the various states-permitting higher rates
for certain transactions and certain lenders, often in exchange for licensing
requirements or other restrictions on those high rate loans-have been
merged into the highest rate permitted any lender for a particular type of
transaction. Federally insured depository institutions may now charge
that highest rate, while mortgage bankers, small loan and consumer
finance companies, oil companies, and all retail stores remain subject to
whatever rates the state legislature has specifically authorized for them.
While this general conclusion follows easily from the above discussion, it
is not so clear how this most favored lender policy actually may operate in
the marketplace. Do the incidental provisions of a favorable state rate law
(such as loan type or duration, or additional charges) bind a federally in-
sured institution that opts to use that law? Do state consumer protection
laws dealing with disclosure, rebates, creditor remedies and the like, appli-
cable to high rate lenders, become applicable to federally insured lenders
that "borrow" that rate? Do federal or state standards on rate computa-
tion control? To what extent may a federally insured institution export a
favorable home state rate to customers in other jurisdictions?
Despite the existence for over a century of most favored lender status for
national banks, those questions have not all been definitively or satisfacto-
rily answered under section 85, and there is, as yet, limited guidance under
DIDMCA.
A. How Much of the State Law Should Apply?
Both section 85 and DIDMCA authorize lenders to charge "interest. ..
at the rate allowed by the laws of the State."3 It is not self-evident, how-
ever, whether this means merely the stated interest rate itself, or includes
other state law limitations that may affect a creditor's yield.
A review of the legislative consideration of DIDMCA reveals that Con-
38. The same language appears in § 85 and in §§ 521-523. See notes 8 & 12 supra.
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gress intended to equalize competition among national banks and all other
federally insured institutions.39 An understanding of the scope of that
competitive equality requires, therefore, analysis of the most favored
lender status which national banks enjoy under section 85. The Supreme
Court first construed that federal statute in the landmark Tany case,'
declaring that national banks were given a specific competitive advantage
over state banks--the right to adopt a rate available to other lenders. The
Court, however, did not construe the federal law to give national banks
any advantages beyond those given the most favored lender in the state.
The Court subsequently restated the holding of Tany as follows: "The
intention of the national law is to adopt the state law, and permit to na-
tional banks what the state law allows to its citizens and to the banks or-
ganized by it."'41 In Union National Bank of Chicago v. Louisville, New
Albany & Chicago Railway42 the Supreme Court had described the effect
of the federal statute:
It may be said that the rights of a national bank to interest are
given by the Federal statute; that the reference to the state law is
only for the measure of those rights. . . . [Tlhe true construction
39. Senator Pryor described the situation existing prior to passage of DIDMCA as
follows:
[Section 85] gives national banks an unfair advantage over ...other financial
institutions.
Section 85. . .provides that a national bank may charge I percent above the
Federal discount rate, notwithstanding any State laws setting an interest-rate ceil-
ing. Such an advantage obviously discriminates. . . against State banks or savings
and loans in those states where the usury-rate ceiling is below the discount
rate . ..
This is. . .not a "usury" issue but a matter of "competitive equality."
126 CONG. REc. S15,684 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1979). Senator Proxmire, explaining the Confer-
ence Report on H.R. 4986 (the DIDMCA of 1980), stated that:
Title V . . .contains a provision which provides parity, or competitive equality,
between national banks and State chartered depository institutions on lending lim-
its.
Under 12 U.S.C. 85, authorized to charge 1 percent over national banks are [sic]
the Federal Reserve discount rate on loans. State chartered depository institutions
are given the benefits of 12 U.S.C. 85 unless a State takes specific action to deny
State chartered institutions that privilege.
126 CONG. REc. S3170 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1980).
40. Tiffany v. National Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1874).
41. Daggs v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 177 U.S. 549, 555 (1900). The Supreme Court con-
strued ambiguous language in the old National Bank Act that allowed a rate of 7% to na-
tional banks where no rate was "fixed by the laws of the state." The Court found that the
national law was intended to adopt the state law so that the Arizona law allowing parties to
agree on a rate constituted a rate "allowed" or "fixed by the laws of the state," and national
banks were not limited to 7% interest.
42. 163 U.S. 325 (1896).
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of state legislation is a matter of state jurisprudence, and while
the rights of the national bank spring from the act of Congress,
yet it is only a right to have an equal administration of the rule
established by state law.
4 3
If the purpose of section 85 was to give national banks equal administra-
tion of state laws, it follows that the purpose of DIDMCA was to equalize
the situation for other federally insured lenders as well. Adoption of the
entire state law as it pertains to determining usurious interest is the logical
result, but it is not always the result that emerges from existing authorities.
1. Computation of the Numerical Rate
Suppose a state law authorizes a particular rate computed on a simple-
interest, or actuarial, basis. May a national bank, or other federally in-
sured lender, borrow that rate figure but compute the actual charge by
discount or add-on methods, or by compounding interest, any of which
may substantially increase the lender's yield? There is a potential conflict
between an early Supreme Court decision and more current lower court
decisions on this issue.
Initially, the Supreme Court construed the National Bank Act to adopt
state usury laws only to the extent they set forth the rate of interest. In
National Bank of Gloversville v. Johnson," the Court stated that "[tihe sole
particular in which national banks are placed on an equality with natural
persons is as to the rate of interest, and not as to the character of contracts
they are authorized to make."45 Then, in 1919, in Evans v. National Bank
of Savannah,' the Supreme Court read the National Bank Act to mean
that the method of computing and taking interest was outside the restric-
tions of "interest at the rate allowed" by state law. The Court therefore
upheld the practice of discounting interest in advance at the maximum
interest rate allowed by the law of Georgia. The Court found that the au-
thority to discount notes was expressly given to associations organized
under the National Bank Act and that this authority
implies reservation of interest in advance; and, .. when dealing
with short-time paper such a reservation at the highest interest
rate allowed by law is not usurious. Recognizing prevailing prac-
tice in business. . . , we think Congress intended to endow na-
tional banks with the power. . . of discounting notes reserving
43. Id. at 331.
44. 104 U.S. 271 (1881). The Court found that the privilege of charging rates fixed by
state law was applicable to both loans and discounts of commercial paper by national banks.
45. Id. at 277.
46. 251 U.S. 108 (1919).
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charges at the highest rate permitted for interest. 7
A strong dissent in Evans considered the question settled by previous
cases: "Although the consequences of acceptance of usurious interest by a
national bank and the penalties to be enforced are to be determined by the
provisions of the National Banking Act, the ascertainment of the rate of
interest allowable is to be according to the state law." '48 Additionally, in
determining the rate allowed under state law, the dissent maintained that
"all applicable provisions of the [state] statutes as interpreted and con-
strued by the court of last resort" should be considered.49
Later cases appear to have restricted Evans to its narrow facts. For ex-
ample, the Eighth Circuit in First National Bank in Mena v. Now/in, 0 ac-
knowledged that it could not overrule Evans, but limited the Evans
holding to the short-term, noninstallment credit which was the subject of
that case. The Nowlin court conceded that refusal to consider more state
law than merely the numerical interest might have been appropriate for
commercial transactions common in the early 1900's. The court, however,
thought that even such a concession required an unnecessarily strained
construction:
[D]etermination of the 'rate allowed by the laws of the State' can
only be accomplished with reference to state court interpretations
of the state's own constitution and statutes. . . . [T]he Federal
Act adopts the entire case law of the state interpreting the state's
limitations on usury; it does not merely incorporate the numeri-
cal rate adopted by the state."'
47. Id. at 114. The Evans Court relied on an earlier Supreme Court opinion which
stated: "It has always been supposed that an authority to discount, or make discounts, did,
from the very force of the terms, necessarily include an authority to take the interest in
advance." Fleckner v. Bank of the United States, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 338 (1823). The
Fleckner case involved the Bank of the United States, which was incorporated by an act of
Congress in 1816 and was a predecessor to the national banking system. The Bank of the
United States, through its enabling statute, was given the authority to make discounts.
48. 251 U.S. at 115 (emphasis added). See also Haseltine v. Central Nat'l Bank, 183
U.S. 132, 134 (1901); Union Nat'l Bank of Chi. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co., 163 U.S.
325, 331 (1896); Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. (23 Wall.) 29, 32
(1875).
49. 251 U.S. at 116.
50. 509 F.2d 872, 875 (8th Cir. 1975). An Arkansa§ national bank sought a declaration
that national banks could discount loans at the maximum state interest rate, despite state
prohibitions on discounting. The result is greater yields than the maximum rate based on a
simple-interest computation.
51. Id. at 876. A federal district court gave Evans a similarly limited reading in Cohen
v. District of Columbia Nat'l Bank, 382 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1974). Evans has also been
criticized on the grounds that, even if a federal (rather than a state) computation rule con-
trols, there is no compelling federal policy to create a uniform national rule. Rather there is,
in § 85, a policy of parity between national banks and state lenders which should dictate
1981]
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In contrast, a Sixth Circuit opinion 2 cited Evans in dictum to the effect
that national banks located in Michigan may compute interest in advance
("discounting" or "adding-on" interest) under section 85, and that this
right "arises independent of state laws."
In recent interpretive letters,13 the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency has construed this case law-principally Evans-as authorizing na-
tional banks to compute interest on an add-on or discount basis when
using the 1% above discount option under section 85. These letters thereby
extend Evans to a situation that did not exist in 1919 since national banks
were not authorized to charge 1% over the Federal Reserve discount rate
until 1933. The OCC letters, however, reflect some tentativeness toward
the rule they extend. In one, for example, the Comptroller's Chief Counsel
notes that "the precise question has not been litigated,""4 and another let-
ter cautions that "further judicial consideration will be required before a
definitive answer can be given about the permissibility under [section 85]
of discounting interest on installment loans when state chartered competi-
tors are not allowed to do so.""
While the rationale of the Eighth Circuit in Nowlin seems more sound
(it accords national banks parity, but not a preferred position, vis-A-vis the
state's most favored lender), the Supreme Court decision in Evans stands
as an unfortunate obstacle to the general adoption of that view.
In contrast, cases interpreting the National Bank Act on the issue of
compounding have supported a more expansive view of how much of the
adoption of the local rule against compounding. Shanks, Special Usury Problems Applicable
to National Banks, 87 BANKING L.J. 483, 495-500 (1970).
52. Northway Lanes v. Hackley Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 464 F.2d 855, 860 (6th
Cir. 1972). It was not necessary, however, for the court in North way Lanes to rely on Evans
to permit reserving interest in advance as Michigan law permitted add-on loans. The Evans
rationale was also relied upon to exempt national banks from state restrictions on closing
costs and loan amount. For a critique of Northway Lanes, see Herstein, Michigan Usury
Law, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 435, 478-86 (1981). See also Ray v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 443 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Tenn. 1978), where the court approved the charging of interest
discounted in advance by national banks under § 85, even though it held the state statute
permitting the practice for state banks unconstitutional because it would exceed the conven-
tional rate per annum in the state constitution. The district court dismissed Nowlin, 509
F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1975) and held that the earlier Sixth Circuit decision in Northway Lanes
was controlling.
53. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 101 (John E. Shockey, Chief Counsel), [1978-1979
Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 85,191; OCC Interpretive Letter No. 115
(Ford Barrett, Ass't Chief Counsel), id. 85,190; OCC Interpretive Letter No. 71 (John G.
Heimann, Comptroller of the Currency), id. 85,146.
54. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 101, supra note 53, at 77,184.
55. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 115, supra note 53, at 77,204. The Maryland court
in Equitable Trust Co. v. Sachs, supra note 35, slip op. no. 2 at 28-31, noted the Comptrol-
ler's equivocation and opted for the Nowlin rationale.
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state law applies when charging "interest at the rate allowed by the laws of
the State."' As early as 1904, the Supreme Court held56 that a national
bank could not compound interest more frequently than permitted under
state law, even though the actual dollar interest charge was less than that
computed at the maximum state rate without compounding. Similarly, in
Acker v. Provident National Bank," the Third Circuit found that Penn-
sylvania case law prohibited compounding interest on revolving credit ac-
counts unless a state statute or a contract provision specifically authorized
that method for computing interest. The Acker court went on to specify
that, where "compound interest is not permitted under the [state law], it
does not matter that the effective rate of compotund interest results in inter-
est charges within the permitted 'simple interest' rate."5" On a parallel
issue, at least one court has ruled that a national bank may not use a 360-
day/year method to calculate interest where this would produce yields in
excess of those permitted under state law.
59
These cases represent the better view. Permission to charge a rate al-
lowed to other lenders under state law should carry with it any restrictions
of that law on the real dollar amounts that can be charged under that rate.
Such restrictions may include not only the method of calculating interest,
but also the method of determining the balance on which the interest will
be computed, and related loan closing costs. Therefore, to restate the ex-
ample above, if a state's small loan law permits interest at a simple annual
rate of 20% on the declining balance of the loan, federally insured lenders
in that state should not be permitted to charge the same rate and discount
the interest in advance or charge the same rate on an add-on basis. Or, in a
state whose rate laws reflect inclusion in the finance charge of charges that
56. Citizens' Nat'l Bank of Kansas City v. Donnell, 195 U.S. 369, 374 (1904). In this
case, Missouri law allowed a contractual interest rate of 8% and permitted compounding of
interest no more than once a year (in effect this authorized the payment of interest on inter-
est). The Court held that a rate of 1% per month on overdrafts (12%) and the compounding
of interest semiannually were usurious. The Court did not accept the bank's arguments that
the overdraft charge was really a penalty for failure to pay a debt, and secondly, that com-
pounding of interest more often than permitted by state law was not usurious if it resulted in
less interest than the law permitted to be charged directly without compounding. Id.
57. 512 F.2d 729, 739 (3d Cir. 1975).
58. Id. at 742. See also Partain v. First Nat'l Bank of Montgomery, 467 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir. 1972).
59. American Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Or., 511 F.2d 980 (9th Cir,),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1974). But see OCC Interpretive Letter No. 102 (John E. Shock-
ey, Chief Counsel), [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) T 85,177, at
77,187: "[I]t is the opinion of our legal staff,. . . that a national bank could compute inter-
est on the 360-day basis under the federal [1% over discount] option currently provided by
[§ 85]."
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are not pure "interest" in the conventional sense,6° such as brokerage fees,
charges for credit reports, or insurance premiums, federally insured lend-
ers should not be permitted to charge "interest" at the highest rate and
then charge separately for the other items. Such a result is inconsistent
with the stated purpose of the most favored lender doctrine, to put national
banks (and via DIDMCA, other federally insured lenders) on a par with
the most favored lender in the state.
2 Classes of Loans
The Comptroller of the Currency has long interpreted section 85 to
mean that a national bank making loans under the most favored lender
doctrine "is subject only to provisions of state law relating to such class of
loans that are material to the determination of the interest rate."'" The
phrase "class of loans" is potentially significant for purposes of determin-
ing which interest rate provisions a federally insured lender may borrow,
but the phrase is not defined anywhere. Credit may be categorized in
broad classes such as consumer loans, commercial loans, or agricultural
loans. Other classes of loans include installment loans or short-term single
payment loans. In addition, open-end plans (charge accounts with varying
balances up to a specified limit) and closed-end accounts (loans for a cer-
tain amount with a stated maturity date) are also distinguishable loan
types. Within the area of consumer credit, classifications include real es-
tate mortgages, mobile home loans, automobile credit, retail charge ac-
counts, bank credit cards, home improvement loans, and student loans.
Generally, the purpose of the loan, its amount and term, and the type of
account could all be considered in determining the "class" of loans.
What little reported case law there is, however, suggests that consumer
credit is fungible, or classless, for purposes of section 85. A federal district
court in United Missouri Bank v. Danforth62 focused on the section 85 lan-
guage "evidence of debt" and declared that consumer loans made under
the state's small loan law involved evidences of debt comparable to trans-
actions through the use of bank credit cards, as defined under the state's
retail credit sales law. Both types of accounts represented loans to consum-
ers for purchasing goods and services. Despite the fact that Missouri small
loan companies did not (and probably could not) offer credit cards or sell
60. This would be true under most state small loan laws where the permitted rate must
cover all creditor costs. It would also be true in those states which have enacted the UNI-
FORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, whose rate ceilings are built on a broad definition of "fi-
nance charge." See UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 1.301(20).
61. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7310 (1980) (emphasis added). See note 16 supra.
62. 394 F. Supp. 774, 783 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
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merchandise, the Danforth court concluded that national banks in Mis-
souri could charge the higher small loan rates on their bank credit cards
even though state banks were limited to the lower retail sales law rates.63
Interpreting DIDMCA, a recent Maryland trial court decision' fol-
lowed the holding in Danforth. Granting partial summary judgment to the
plaintiff banks, the court held that the state small loan law could be ap-
plied to both the cash-advance and purchase features of bank open-end
credit plans:
The unmistakable conclusion is that Congress intended to control
loans ('interest') and purchases ('evidence of debt') and intended
to control them indistinguishably. Therefore, while there may be
statutory (and other) distinctions between credit card loans and
credit card purchases, such distinctions do not constitute suffi-
cient generic dissimilarity to withstand the preemptive impact of
the federal legislation.
6 5
If "class of loans" is any determinant of which transactions are entitled to
interest at the most favorable interest rate, it appears that a federally in-
sured bank under DIDMCA may consider small loan transactions to be in
the same category as both cash-advance and purchase transactions on
open-end plans.
More incisive, and perhaps more workable in the long run, is a recent
OCC staff letter66 responding to a series of inquiries about which state law
provisions carried over to national banks for purposes of section 85. The
letter agreed that state law characterization of a charge as a "time price
differential" is immaterial: "[Tihere is no difference between a statute
fixing a maximum 'time price differential' and one fixing a maximum in-
terest rate." Thus, a national bank could use rates from the state Retail
Installment Sales Act (RISA) for its credit card plan. Moreover, the bank
could use those rates without complying with the RISA disclosure provi-
sions which the OCC staff thought were not material to the rate limitation.
But the Retail Installment Sales Act, by its terms, was not applicable to
transactions involving money and certain other products. This, according
to OCC staff, barred the national bank from using RISA rates for the cash
63. Id. at 785. See also Commissioner of Small Loans v. First Nat'l Bank of Md., 268
Md. 305, 300 A.2d 685 (1973); Rockland-Atlas Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Murphy, 329 Mass.
755, 110 N.E.2d 638 (1953).
64. Equitable Trust Co. v. Sachs, supra note 35.
65. Id. slip op. no. I at 45. This rather glib conclusion by the court overlooks the tradi-
tional distinction between "interest" (on loans) and the theory of time-price differential that
permitted charges in sale transactions above prevailing usury ceilings. Arguably, this makes
cash loans and credit sales different classes of credit transactions.
66. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 178, 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 97,239 (1981).
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advance portion of its credit card plan, and indeed barred the bank from
using the RISA rate at all unless it was prepared to "establish controls to
ensure that the higher rates are not charged on excluded transactions."67
Banks utilizing most favored lender status, under this rationale, must be
prepared to apply the borrowed rate only to appropriate transactions, and
not to transactions expressly excluded from the coverage of the borrowed
rate law. This analysis casts some doubt on the reliability of the Danforth
holding, where the court did not even inquire whether the state small loan
law allowed its rates to be used for open-end plans or for retail sales.
The ostensible goal of section 85, and of DIDMCA, is lender parity, not
transactional homogenization. Thus, when a state segments its rate struc-
ture not by groups of lenders but by types of credit transactions, there is no
enhancement of competitive equality in allowing federally insured institu-
tions, but not other lenders, to transport the high rates permitted for one
kind of transaction (e.g., three year old motor vehicles) to a completely
different setting (e.g., credit card plans). The OCC staff letter properly
recognized this distinction.
3. Provisions "Material to a Determination of the Interest Rate"
For many years, the Comptroller has maintained the view that when a
national bank borrows a rate under the most favored lender principle the
bank is subject to all portions of that state law that are "material to a
determination of the interest rate."
68
With the exception of an occasional interpretive letter69 from the Comp-
troller, there does not appear to have been much explication of what this
"materiality" test means for national banks. The Maryland court, in Equi-
table Trust,7 ° accepted materiality as the controlling rule by approving an
earlier interpretation from the Comptroller which would subject national
banks to "all limitations of substance"'" in the borrowed rate law. The
question then arises whether "limitations of substance" is to be read nar-
rowly to include only those provisions that affect calculation of the explicit
contractual rate of charge, or broadly to include any provisions that affect
or may affect the creditor's aggregate yield or the borrower's aggregate
67. Id.
68. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7310 (1980). The pertinent text of the interpretation is set out in note
16 supra.
69. E.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 178, supra note 66.
70. Equitable Trust Co. v. Sachs, supra note 35.
71. Id., slip op. no. 2, at 3. This alternate phrasing traces to an earlier summary of
Comptroller opinion letters. Comptroller of the Currency, Digest of Opinions 9510 (1960).
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cost.
72
The rate of charge permitted on a class of credit transactions may be a
function of many things. The Federal Reserve Board's Regulation z,
7 3
pursuant to the Federal Truth In Lending Act 7a (TIL), considers "interest"
to be only one component of the "finance charge," which then must be
disclosed as an "annual percentage rate."75 Components of the finance
charge, as defined by TIL, may or may not be defined as interest under
state law for purposes of usury limitations. 76 Where state law is less com-
prehensive regarding elements of the finance charge, the stated interest
ceiling may reflect the fact that other charges are allowed in addition to the
application of an interest rate.77 The rate permitted is also likely to be a
function of the method of calculating interest. 78 Where a rate of interest
"per annum" is specified by state law, discounted loans where the bor-
rower pays interest in advance may be usurious if the effective rate, as
contrasted with the stated rate exceeds the legal maximum.7 9 As previ-
ously mentioned, the class of loans should be considered material to a de-
termination of the interest rate.80 The amount of the loan (which may be
affected by the method of computing unpaid balances for open-end credit
transactions) is also material to interest rate limits imposed by state law.8'
72. In fact, the Maryland court took an all-inclusive view of what provisions of the state
small loan law are material to the rate. See notes 94-102 and accompanying text infra.
73. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1981).
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 to 1681 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
75. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4, as amended by 46 Fed. Reg. 20,848, 20,894 (1981),
defines "finance charge" broadly to include "any charge payable directly or indirectly by the
consumer and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to or a condition
of the extention of credit." Disclosure of the annual percentage rate is required under
§§ 226.6(a)(2) and 226.7(d) for open-end transaction, and under § 226.18(e) for closed-end
credit.
76. For example, loan fees or points and credit report fees may be considered interest
under state law. Cf., UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 1.301(20)(a)(iv).
77. For example, the court in Equitable Trust, supra note 35, held that annual member-
ship fees for credit card accounts were not interest as defined by state law and, therefore,
were not usurious.
78. Under the UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, for example, a seller must compute
closed-end rates as simple-interest, on the declining balance. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT
CODE § 2.201. However, for open-end seller accounts, the UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT
CODE authorizes several different balance assessment methods which can produce different
yields. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.202(2).
79. See Cohen v. District of Columbia Nat'l Bank, 382 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1974).
80. See notes 61-67 and accompanying text supra.
81. In OCC Interpretive Letter No. 178, supra note 66, the Comptroller's Office stated
that a bank borrowing a small loan rate was bound by the small loan law limitations on the
total amount of the loan. Specifically, the bank could not use the small loan rate (which was
authorized only for loans up to $3,000) for the first $3,000 of a larger credit balance. See
also Deak Nat'l Bank v. Bond, 89 Misc. 2d 95, 390 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1976).
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Beyond these obvious material factors, it is not self-evident whether factors
such as type of security, length of the loan, or others, should be considered
determinative of interest rates even though they clearly affect a creditor's
aggregate yield. A workable test is needed to determine how much of the
favorable state law applies to the federally insured lender that borrows its
rate. A tempting standard-and one that would be relatively easy to ap-
ply-would be to say that a federally insured institution borrowing a most
favored state rate is bound by all aspects of that law that regulate or limit
components of the finance charge as computed and disclosed under the
federal Truth in Lending Act. State laws limiting brokers' fees, credit re-
ports, transaction charges, mortgage insurance premiums and other items
enumerated as part of the finance charge under Regulation Z would then
apply to a federally insured lender as incident to the borrowed rate. State
laws on such matters as application or membership fees, late charges, re-
bate methods, and security would not so apply.
The problem with this standard is that it is obviously artificial. It uses
criteria from a law aimed at disclosing aggregate borrower costs to meas-
ure what portions of state law affect a creditor's yield and thus its competi-
tive position. The Truth in Lending Act indicates explicitly that, except
for disclosure, it does not "otherwise annul, alter or affect in any manner
the meaning, scope or applicability" of any state laws, including usury
laws.82 On the other hand, this standard could work smoothly in Uniform
Consumer Credit Code states where the definition of finance charge for
rate-setting purposes is virtually identical to the Truth in Lending defini-
tion for disclosure purposes.
An approach that may help determine which provisions are material to
the interest rate is one that includes all provisions tied directly to an au-
thorized interest rate aspreconditions for its use.83 For example, state law
may specify a rate of 36% for short-term consumer loans but permit a rate
of no more that 18% for longer term or refinanced transactions. In such a
state, federally insured lenders could charge the favorable 36% rate only
for the initial extension of credit but could not charge the same rate on an
extended or refinanced transaction. Similarly, a bank could not "borrow"
the rate specifically authorized for loans under $1,000 unless it was in fact
extending credit below that figure. In these examples, the amount and
term of the loan, as well as extension features, would be determinative of
82. Truth in Lending Act, § IIl(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1610(b) (1976).
83. This is essentially the test applied by the Comptroller of the Currency in the staff
letter cited in note 66 supra. See also Rockland-Atlas Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Murphy, 329
Mass. 755, 110 N.E.2d 638 (1953) (bank cannot collect an attorney's fee where not author-
ized under applicable state law).
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the interest rate. On the other hand, the formula for late payment charges
may be identical whether the applicable rate is 18% or 36%. In that situa-
tion, late payment fee provisions would not be determinative of the interest
rate. That is, the lender would not be bound by the late payment fee pro-
vision of the small loan law, but would remain subject to any late-fee re-
strictions applicable generally to banks.
A more narrow approach that may be helpful to identify those provi-
sions of state law which affect the determination of the interest rate would
be to consider "material" only those provisions that affect the creditor's
charges when the contract is performed according to its terms, without de-
linquency, default, or refinancing. For example, loan term, purpose of the
loan, loan amount, and service fees or other closing costs would be in-
cluded. But fees for late payments, default charges, or even prepayment
penalty charges would not be material to the interest rate determination
since they would only come into play if the contract were not performed in
accordance with the agreement of the parties. This approach, though,
could put the federally insured lender in a significantly better position than
the most favored state lender--i e., free to contract for the highest rate, but
not bound by state restrictions on default remedies.
In the two approaches just discussed, the results would be the same for
provisions on loan purpose, term and amount, and those concerning late
payment or default penalties. There would be a difference in result, how-
ever, for requirements on rebating unearned interest charges on prepay-
ment or refinancing. The rebate method may be tied to a particular rate or
loan term. 4 The method of rebating obviously affects the creditor's yield,
yet the earning of any rebate assumes the original payment schedule has
been truncated or otherwise modified. Under the first suggested approach,
the bank would have to comply with the rebate provision of the small loan
law, while under the second the bank would not be so bound.
Other aspects of state law are not so readily characterized as "material"
to the rate. For example, if a state has, for example, removed rate ceilings
for home mortgage transactions but retained them for other forms of
credit, a bank presumably could not "borrow" that unlimited mortgage
rate for automobile installment loans or credit cards.85 This would not be
84. For example, the UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE permits use of the Rule of
78s for transactions up to 48 installments, but requires use of an actuarial rebate calculation
for longer term transactions. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.510.
85. This would also run afoul of the "class of loans" criterion. Moreover it would cre-
ate a special anomaly under DIDMCA. Section 501 of that act preempts all state law limit-
ing rates in residential first mortgage transactions. Thus, there is no rate ceiling for first
mortgages (except for those states that have acted to override § 501). If federally insured
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a rate allowed to a class of lenders but only for a class of transactions, and
the bank could use it only when making home mortgage loans. But sup-
pose a state law authorized an attractive rate for licensed lenders provided
they took no real property security. Is the proviso a limitation on the class
of loans, or merely an independent restriction on the permissible security?
Under the better view, the proviso would be material, and a bank could
not use that rate if it engaged in mortgage lending. Under the narrower
second approach suggested above, however, the bank might borrow the
rate while disregarding the security limitation.
A sharp example of this kind of dilemma could arise under the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code. Sellers may charge 2% per month on their open-
end plans, while lenders are limited to 18% annually, or 1 1/2% per
month.86 But sellers are restricted to purchase money security interests,
8 7
while lenders may take any security they desire.88 May a bank borrow the
2% rate without the security interest limitation? The older case law under
section 85 would seem to say yes.89 Further, there is nothing in the several
interpretations of the Comptroller's Office9" that requires a different con-
clusion. The security interest limitation is an independent restriction on
sellers, not integrally tied to the rate ceiling, and in fact subject to a sepa-
rate penalty for violation. Thus it seems arguable that under existing pre-
cedent federally insured institutions may legally attain more than simple
parity with the state's most favored lender. They may combine the best of
both worlds to obtain lending flexibility not enjoyed by any lenders under
state law.
Two other examples will serve to highlight the issue and its difficulty.
Suppose the general banking law in the state permits a bank issuing credit
cards to charge an annual fee, but the small loan law does not. May a
federally insured lender borrow the small loan rate for its card program
but continue to charge the annual fee? The Maryland court in Equitable
Trust9 rejected the bankers' argument that, since the authorized fee is not
part of the bank's normal interest charge, when a bank borrows the small
lenders could, under §§ 521-523 of that Act, claim unlimited rate privileges for non-mort-
gage credit by "borrowing" the rate from § 501, DIDMCA-like the proverbial snake-
would have eaten its own tail.
86. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.203(3), 2.401(1).
87. Id. § 3.301.
88. The only restriction on a lender's security rights is the limited "marshalling" provi-
sion in UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.116, which comes into play at the foreclo-
sure stage and is not a limitation at the contracting stage.
89. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text supra.
90. See notes 66-68 supra.
91. Equitable Trust Co. v. Sachs, supra note 35, slip op. no. 2 at 15-19.
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loan rate to determine interest, it remains free to impose the annual fee.
The court's conclusion seems correct under the better view suggested
above, that when borrowing a rate a lender takes it subject to all precondi-
tions for that rate. If one of those restrictions is that the lender may impose
no additional charges, the bank should be so limited.
Variable or floating rates provide another example. Must federally in-
sured lenders comply with any restrictions on rate fluctuations in the state
law it borrows under the most favored lender doctrine? For the same rea-
sons just suggested, the answer should be yes. Those restrictions are limi-
tations on the type or class of loans, and to that extent are preconditions to
its use. Persuasive of the same conclusion are a number of FHLBB staff
interpretations92 of DIDMCA section 501, the residential mortgage pre-
emption provision. Those letters indicate that while mortgage lenders are
free to set the initial rate as high as they wish, they remain subject to state
restrictions on the amount or frequency of any step increases, or on the
aggregate rate increase over the term of the loan. The same view should
apply under sections 521-523."3
Against this background of possible approaches to the identification of
provisions of state law which are material in determining the interest .rate,
the decision in Equitable Trust94 presents a sweeping standard that
amounts to a virtual "all or nothing" rule. The court held that if national
banks (under section 85) or federally insured lenders (under DIDMCA)
wished to use the higher rates authorized under the Maryland Consumer
Loan Law, they must comply with all substantive provisions of that law,
including those that have only the most tenuous connection to the interest
rate.
92. FHLBB Interpretive Letter No. 53, from Milan C. Miskovsky, General Counsel
(Sept. 22, 1980); FHLBB Interpretive Letter No. 59, from Milan C. Miskovsky, General
Counsel (Aug. 26, 1980).
93. The question gets considerably more complicated if the lender is federally chartered
and federal law explicitly authorizes it to impose variable or floating rate terms. (This is
currently the fact in the mortgage area for national banks, federal savings and loan associa-
tions and federal credit unions.) See 12 C.F.R. §§ 29, 545, 701.21-68 (1981). There would
now be not simply a question of the preemption of state law, but a clash of two federal rules:
one permitting banks to use adjustable rate features, the other saying that if the bank bor-
rows a rate from another class of lender under state law, it takes that rate as it finds it (i e.,
with its restrictions on rate adjustments). One view might be that, since the most favored
lender doctrine flows directly from a federal statute, while the adjustable rate authorization
is merely an agency regulation, the agency policy that contradicts the statute must give way.
Perhaps the stronger case would rely on a variation of Evans, 251 U.S. 108 (1919), which
concluded that federally chartered institutions are empowered by federal law to charge vari-
able rates, and, when they borrow a/rate figure, it is only that figure that binds them. In
essence, they retain all their federal 'powers. We leave this issue for others to resolve.
94. See note 35 supra, slip op. no. 2.
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In its supplemental opinion, the court first held that the pertinent stan-
dard is indeed that suggested in the Comptroller's interpretation- e., that
national banks exercising most favored lender status are subject to state
law provisions which are "material to the determination of the interest
rate."95 But, by reference to an earlier version of the Comptroller opinion,
the court articulated a standard which is much more consistent with its
eventual broad. holding: national banks using favorable state rate laws are
"subject to all limitations of substance with respect to size, maturity of the
loan and the like, which are prescribed by the State statute authorizing the
higher rate." 96 From this posture, the court reviewed the consumer loan
law and found all of the following provisions material, and therefore bind-
ing on federal lenders:
- Provisions that specify a numerical rate or amount of inter-
est, including provisions that limit interest on overdue loans and
on refinancings;
97
- Provisions that fix the amount of the loan, particularly the
$6,000 loan maximum but including restrictions on loans dis-
guised as purchases, and on loan splitting;98
- Sections that prescribe methods of interest computation
and of loan repayment; this includes rules requiring that interest
be computed on the declining unpaid balance, and barring pre-
payment penalties;99
- Proscriptions on extra fees and charges, which have the ef-
fect of preventing banks from charging the annual fees that the
same court would permit them to charge under the general rate
law;' o
- Limitations on the maximum term or maturity of loans; 01
- Provisions that only indirectly affect the interest rate, such
as an anti-holder in due course rule, and prohibitions on con-
fessed judgment notes, wage assignments, blank or incomplete
instruments, and real property security. 
02
This series of rulings amounts to a holding that any financial institution
wishing to be treated as a loan company (with respect to rates) must accept
this status fully: the institution acquires neither a greater nor a lesser reve-
95. Id. at 2-3.
96. Id. at 3, quoting from Comptroller of the Currency, Digest of Opinions 9510
(1960) (emphasis added).
97. Equitable Trust Co. v. Sachs, supra note 35, slip op. no. 2 at 4-7.
98. Id. at 8-10.
99. Id. at 10-14.
100. Id. at 15-19.
101. Id. at 19-21.
102. Id. at 21-23.
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nue opportunity than the loan companies enjoy, taking as the measuring
rod the aggregate yield the lender may realize from transactions under the
consumer loan act. This result is generally consistent with the theoretical
underpinnings of the most favored lender doctrine-that federal lenders
may achieve parity, no more, no less.
On closer scrutiny, the attractiveness of the holding is somewhat superfi-
cial. An inquiry into whether state law provisions are material to determi-
nation of an interest rate becomes, under the court's analysis, a quest for
all provisions having a substantial bearing on the creditor's conduct in the
transaction. 0 3 This proves both too much and too little. Too much, in
that it is difficult to see what the nexus is, for example, between interest
rates and a prohibition against using blank contract forms. Too little, in
that the state law provisions which ultimately affect a lender's interest rate
may range far beyond those contained in the particular rate law. Branch-
ing or licensing laws, capitalization requirements, fee structures for de-
mand deposits, and taxes can have a "material" influence on the terms of a
lender's loan offerings.
The holding is troublesome in another-ironic-respect. It will force
open-end credit card plans to adapt to rules clearly designed for closed-
end credit plans. Financial institutions opting to use the consumer loan
law rate may have to pay a heavy price for the privilege. While they will
gain access to a higher rate, and will not need to give their credit card
customers a free-ride period, 104 they will be barred from charging annual
membership fees, foreclosed from computing unpaid balances on an aver-
age-daily-balance or comparable formula, and required to program their
systems to account for maximum maturity schedules.1'0 These trade-offs
103. The court relies on a Comptroller opinion that states the test not as "materiality,"
but in terms of "limitations of substance." See note 96 and accompanying text supra. The
foreword to the 1960 digest of opinions merely indicates that it is a reprinting of a 1948
edition. Another source indicates that the phrasing was simply an early stage in the evolu-
tion of what is now the official OCC Interpretive Ruling. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, 2 COMPTROLLER'S INTERPRETIVE RULINGS: CHANGES IN TEXT, 1948-1977
7310 (undated). Thus it seems the Equitable Trust court gave $ 9510 an undeserved
stature.
104. The court "reluctantly" ruled that if a bank opted for the higher consumer loan law
rate, it could charge interest from the date of a credit card transaction, without allowing the
free-ride period required under the general banking law. Equitable Trust Co. v. Sachs,
supra note 35, slip op. no. 2 at 27.
105. The plaintiff banks in Equitable Trust argued that compliance with those sections of
the Maryland Consumer Loan Law governing the maximum terms of repayment (maturi-
ties) and the method of computing interest would "be impracticable, undesirable and
(would] in effect, prevent their credit card operations" and would "unlawfully vitiate their
most favored lender status." d. at 32. That observation almost certainly overstates the
actual burdens to the banks in converting their computer programs, but the net effect of
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could well prompt a financial institution to conclude that the benefits are
not worth the cost, that there is no real advantage in most favored lender
status.
4. Consumer Protection Provisions Generally
This discussion raises an important policy question which permeates the
most favored lender debate: should federally insured lenders, while en-
joying rate relief as most favored lenders, be required to comply with con-
sumer protection provisions in borrowed rate laws, whether or not those
consumer protections affect the rate of interest? Although DIDMCA al-
lows federally insured depository institutions to charge the most favorable
rate for a particular class of loans, it does not specifically preempt other
provisions of those state laws which may have influenced the setting of that
rate (except, apparently, requirements for state licensing or supervision of
federally chartered institutions)."° The FHLBB, alone among the agen-
cies affected by DIDMCA, has interpreted most favored lender status
under that act to require federally insured savings and loan associations to
comply with all substantive requirements of the state law, including con-
sumer protections that do not affect the rate at all, if the institutions wish to
these changes will be to decrease somewhat the attractiveness of exercising the most favored
lender option.
The operational problems created for bank credit card issuers would challenge the most
sophisticated computer programmer. For banks to use the higher rate, their credit card bill-
ing systems would have to calculate interest on a daily basis (to reflect the declining balance)
while simultaneously readjusting minimum monthly payment requirements to make certain
that all balances are paid off within the specified maturities. The interest rates authorized
under the Maryland Consumer Loan Law are also step-rates, so that the daily calculations
will also have to juggle those variables.
More ominously for the banks, the Attorney General is appealing the case, contending
that the "merchants discount fee" and the "interchange fee" (fees among merchants and
card-processing banks, not directly assessed to the cardholder) are subject to the provisions
of Maryland's Consumer Loan Law which prohibit collecting indirectly any charges not
otherwise permitted by law. The court found that such fees were not material to the interest
rate agreed to by the cardholder. Id. at 20. If, on appeal, the court's decision is reversed on
this issue, the banks face a substantial disincentive to borrow the Consumer Loan Law rates,
because the merchant discount contributes measurably to the credit card program's profit-
ability. The unattractive alternative for the card-issuing banks would be to raise interest
rates even higher to compensate for the inability to assess those extra fees.
106. The Comptroller of the Currency has ruled that national banks "may lawfully
charge the highest rate permitted to be charged by a State-licensed small loan company or
morris plan bank, without being so licensed." 12 C.F.R. § 7.7310 (1980) (emphasis added).
The FHLBB has read the same limitation into DIDMCA: "Federally-chartered insured
institutions would not be required to submit to state most-favored-lender restrictions that
are primarily procedural or regulatory in nature. Such restrictions would include licensing,
bonding, and reporting to state authorities." 46 Fed. Reg. 13,987-88 (1981) (to be codified in
12 C.F.R. § 570.1 l(c)).
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charge the most favored lender rate.'0 7
The fact that Congress has allowed the states to override usury preemp-
tions under DIDMCA recognizes that states may have public policies that
are inconsistent with unlimited rate competition. Usury limits and related
provisions containing consumer protections are clear expressions of those
policies. There is no evidence that Congress meant to displace all the pro-
tective aspects of state rate laws when it provided for the extension of most
favored lender status.'08 It is reasonable to conclude that Congress antici-
pated that state laws permitting favorable rates and also providing bor-
rower protections would be followed in all aspects of the credit transaction.
To hold otherwise gives federally insured lenders artificial advantages over
all other creditors, rather than competitive equality.
It is debatable, however, which consumer protections apply when a bank
borrows the most favored lender rate for a particular type of credit. Many
provisions that affect a lender's earnings may also be consumer protec-
tions. Restrictions on service or transaction charges, annual fees, or rebate
or balance assessment methods can have a substantial effect on the amount
of revenue actually generated. A federally insured lender may wish to
charge a small loan rate that is higher than otherwise permitted under state
law for its installment loan program. Under DIDMCA, the bank appar-
ently may borrow the most favorable rate for that class of loan, but do
small loan act provisions apply with regard to, e.g., security, disclosures,
default charges and remedies, or rebate methods? Obviously, where the
same protections apply to small loan companies and to banks, there is no
problem.0 9 But if the rebate method is more protective under the small
107. "Consumer protections specifically required in such loans when made by the most
favored lender would also be considered substantive and must be included in loans made by
insured institutions which desire to use most-favored-lender rates." 46 Fed. Reg. 13,987-88
(1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 570.11(b)). The explanatory material accompanying
the FHLBB interpretation indicates that this includes "state law requirements as to loan
term and amount, use of proceeds, identity of borrower, etc." It continues: "Substantive
state law requirements would also include provisions governing prepayment refunds, late
charges, credit life insurance, permissible security interests, and similar consumer protections. "
Id (emphasis added). Moreover, in doubtful cases the determination of what state law
provisions are substantive is to be made by state officials.
The FHLBB does not explain the basis for its conclusion that most favored lender status
requires compliance with all "substantive" consumer protection provisions in the borrowed
rate law. The Maryland court, in Equitable Trust, supra note 35, however, finds this FHLBB
interpretation "highly persuasive and.., a harbinger of things to come." Id., slip op. no. 2
at 23.
108. This deference to state consumer protections is reflected also in the FHLBB's regu-
lations on the residential mortgage preemption section of DIDMCA. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 590.3(c) (1981).
109. Under the UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, for example, most restrictions on
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loan law, while the required disclosures are less protective, there is a policy
conflict. And who can say ultimately which of the many varied provisions
in small loan laws, retail installment sales acts, or general banking laws,
are "more protective" than counterpart provisions in other laws.
The Maryland decision in Equitable Trust, presents a classic example of
this dilemma. Whether compelled by the most favored lender doctrine or
not, it may be good public policy (and may also promote competitive par-
ity) to require banks seeking the consumer loan law rate to comply with
that law's restrictions on creditor remedies."' But, in the process of re-
quiring this compliance, the court found that the banks were excused from
their obligation under the general banking law to afford credit card cus-
tomers a free-ride period before finance charges began to accrue. This
frustrates a clear and focused policy of the State of Maryland to provide
cardholders with this specific protection. It also points out the dangers in
an "all or nothing" approach to most favored lender status, as reflected in
the Maryland case.
It may be the sounder policy to require federally insured institutions to
comply with the requirements in ,the borrowed rate law, but only to the
extent the consumer protections in that law demonstrably affect the rate or
amount of interest, or are preconditions to charging that higher rate.
Otherwise, the protections contained in the state law that would normally
govern the transaction ought to apply. In the Maryland case, under this
test, federally insured banks would comply with all rate-related provisions
in the consumer loan law, but provisions in the general banking law on
creditor remedies, disclosure, and even possibly on free-ride periods would
also remain applicable. As a practical advantage, this policy avoids artifi-
cial substitutions of consumer protections from one law for those in an-
other. For example, disclosures called for under a small loan law
(typically closed-end credit) may be ill-suited for bank credit card plans to
which other more appropriately designed disclosure rules already apply. It
would be foolish to force a bank borrowing the small loan law to use that
law's disclosure scheme merely because in some tangential way it was
thought to be material or "substantive" with respect to the small loan
rate. ' 1
contract provisions and creditor remedies are universally applicable to all creditors. See
generally UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, art. 3.
110. See notes 94-105 and accompanying text srupra.
111. In an advisory letter interpreting DIDMCA, the Michigan Commissioner of Finan-
cial Institutions reached just such a pragmatic conclusion. She concluded that financial in-
stitutions making loans under the Small Loan Act would not have to give monthly receipts
for payments received as required by the Small Loan Act: such a requirement "has no direct
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B. Does State or Federal Law Determine Penalties?
Both section 86 of Title 12 of the United States Code and sections 521-
523 of DIDMCA contain penalty provisions" t2 for violations of those sec
impact on the yield, amount or other terms of the loan." Michigan Financial Institutions
Bureau Interpretive Letter, May 21, 1981.
112. 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1976) provides:
The taking, receiving, reserving, or charging a rate of interest greater than is al-
lowed by section 85 of this title, when knowingly done, shall be deemed a forfeiture
of the entire interest which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt carries with it,
or which has been agreed to be paid thereon. In case the greater rate of interest has
been paid, the person by whom it has been paid, or his legal representatives, may
recover back, in an action in the nature of an action of debt, twice the amount of
the interest thus paid from the association taking or receiving the same: Provided,
That such action is commenced within two years from the time the usurious trans-
action occurred.
Section 521 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (Supp. IV 1980)) (amending the Federal De-
posit Insurance Act) reads in pertinent part:
(b) If the rate prescribed in subsection (a) exceeds the rate such State bank or
such insured branch of a foreign bank would be permitted to charge in the absence
of this section, and such State fixed rate is thereby preempted by the rate described
in subsection (a), the taking, receiving, reserving, or charging a greater rate of in-
terest than is allowed by subsection (a), when knowingly done, shall be deemed a
forfeiture of the entire interest which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt carries
with it, or which has been agreed to be paid thereon. If such greater rate of interest
has been paid the person who paid it may recover in a civil action commenced in a
court of appropriate jurisdiction not later than two years after the date of such
payment, an amount equal to twice the amount of the interest paid from such State
bank or such insured branch of a foreign bank taking, receiving, reserving, or
charging such interest.
Section 522 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1730g (Supp. IV 1980)) (amending Title IV of the
National Housing Act) reads in pertinent part:
(b) If the rate prescribed in subsection (a) exceeds the rate such institution would
be permitted to charge in the absence of this section, and such State fixed rate is
thereby preempted by the rate described in subsection (a) of this section, the tak-
ing, receiving, reserving, or charging a greater rate of interest than that prescribed
by subsection (a) of this section, when knowingly done, shall be deemed a forfei-
ture of the entire interest which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt carries with
it, or which has been agreed to be paid thereon. If such greater rate of interest has
been paid, the person who paid it may recover, in a civil action commenced in a
court of appropriate jurisdiction not later than two years after the date of such
payment, an amount equal to twice the amount of the interest paid from the insti-
tution taking or receiving such interest.
Section 523 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1785g (Supp. IV 1980)) (amending the Credit Union
Act) reads in pertinent part:
(2) If the rate prescribed in paragraph (1) exceeds the rate such credit union
would be permitted to charge in the absence of this subsection, and such State fixed
rate is thereby preempted by the rate described in paragraph (1), the taking, receiv-
ing, reserving, or charging a greater rate than is allowed by paragraph (1), when
knowingly done, shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest which the loan
carries with it, or which has been agreed to be paid thereon. If such greater rate of
interest has been paid, the person who paid it may recover, in a civil action corn-
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tions which set forth rates permitted to federally insured lenders. There-
fore, penalties for excessive charges are determined as a matter of federal
law. For example, where State .4 permits an annual rate of 18% for con-
sumer installment credit and the current ninety-day federal discount rate is
17.5%, a federally insured state bank charging 19% would be subject to the
penalties described in DIDMCA for exceeding both the most favored state
rate and the option of 1% above the discount rate. Although the penalty
provisions of DIDMCA have not yet been interpreted by the courts, sec-
tion 86 has been construed to offer two remedies, depending upon the facts
of the case. The Supreme Court in Haseltine v. Central National Bank" 3
interpreted section 86 as follows:
Two separate and distinct classes of cases are contemplated by
this section: first, those wherein usurious interest has been taken,
received, reserved or charged, in which case there shall be 'a for-
feiture of the entire interest which the note, bill or other evidence
of debt carries with it,' . . . second in case usurious interest has
been paid, the person paying it may recover back twice the
amount of the interest 'thus paid from the association taking or
receiving the same.' 
14
In the example cited above, the bank must forfeit all interest on the usuri-
ous debt. In effect, the borrower is obligated only to repay the principal of
a usurious loan. If any interest at the usurious rate was paid, the borrower
can recover from the bank, in a separate action, twice the amount of inter-
est paid. There is, however, a two year statute of limitations on the sepa-
rate right of action." 5
Both section 86 and the penalty provisions of DIDMCA specify that the
penalties apply when the charging of excessive interest is "knowingly
done." Clearly, intentional charging of usurious interest is a knowing vio-
lation." '6 The requisite intent, however, is simply an intent to receive
menced in a court of appropriate jurisdiction not later than two years after the date
of such payment, an amount equal to twice the amount of the interest paid from
the credit union taking or receiving such interest.
113. 183 U.S. 132 (1901).
114. Id. at 135 (emphasis in original).
115. The statutory text is set out in note 112 supra. Note that the statute of limitations in
§ 86 runs "two years from the time the usurious transaction occurred." The statute of limi-
tations in the applicable sections of DIDMCA is apparently longer, "not later than two years
after the date of. . . payment" of the usurious interest.
116. In American Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Or., 511 F.2d 980, 983
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975), the circuit court held that a national bank,
which knew that its computation of interest based on a 360 day year would result in interest
in excess of that based on a calendar (or 365 day) year, was intentionally charging excessive
interest even though the bank did not know it was illegal.
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compensation at a rate in excess of the interest permitted by law." 7
In view of the requirement that usurious charges be "knowingly" im-
posed before penalties are exacted under the federal statutes, an important
question remains as to whether the federal law is exclusive in this area.
Where the federal discount rate exceeds the most favored lender rate, only
federal penalties are applicable because the state limits are preempted and,
as such, are not violated where the federal discount rate option is in force.
Where the bank elects the most favorable rate as determined by state law
but charges a greater amount or additional fees not permitted by that law,
is the federal penalty all that is permitted for violations of section 85 or
DIDMCA, or may the debtor elect a state remedy, or aggregate state and
federal remedies? Unlike the trend in section 85 case law that generally
state rather than federal law defines usury, the courts continue to consider
section 86 an exclusive federal remedy."' That is, even if state law pro-
vides a penalty for usury not "knowingly done," the existence of section 86
preempts imposition of that sanction. It appears that federally insured
lenders, like national banks, therefore, are favored lenders with regard to
penalties as well as permissible interest charges. Indeed, the result may be
that such lenders are actually granted a status superior to the most favored
state lender. In the previous example, suppose the discount rate is 16.5%
and the most favored state rate is 18%. A bank charging 20% would vio-
late state usury limitations and federal law by charging in excess of both
the most favored lender rate (18%) and the federal option (1% above
16.5%). If state law would impose penalties regardless of intent or knowl-
edge, or if such penalties include invalidation of any security interest as
well as forfeiture of usurious interest, federally insured lenders under
DIDMCA may avoid the loss of interest by showing the excessive charges
117. McAdoo v. Union Nat'l Bank of Little Rock, 535 F.2d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 1976).
The court referred to Arkansas law to determine whether the bank's required deposit bal-
ance resulted in a usurious transaction with usurious intent. The court stated in dictum that
knowingly charging an amount in excess of interest permitted by law was sufficient for usu-
rious intent even though there was no intent to violate usury laws. Cf. Crenshaw v. First
Tenn. Bank, 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 97,486 (Tenn. App. 1980) (a national bank was
found to lack the necessary scienter when it charged rates authorized by a state statute later
found unconstitutional).
118. "[S]ince Congress has provided a penalty for'usury, that action preempts the field
and leaves no room for varying state penalties." First Nat'l Bank in Mena v. Nowlin, 509
F.2d 872, 881 (8th Cir. 1975).
A Florida court, in Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 359 So. 2d 466, 467 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979), held that interest at the maximum rate under state law
computed on the basis of a 360 day year rather than a calendar year was usurious, but that
the state law penalty provision was inapplicable because the bank is subject to § 86, "which
furnishes the exclusive remedy when a national bank is found guilty of exacting usurious
interest." 359 So. 2d at 469.
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were not knowingly made. 9 In addition, federal law has no provision for
loss of any security interest on a usurious loan.
A further complication can arise if either section 85 or DIDMCA is con-
strued to require compliance by the federally insured lender with all con-
sumer protection provisions of the borrowed state rate law (as the FHLBB
has required for savings and loan associations). 20 What sanction awaits a
lender who fails to comply with those nonrate consumer protection provi-
sions of the state law, for example, by taking excessive security? Under
one analysis, it is possible to argue that a lack of compliance with the se-
curity limitations will disqualify the lender for most favored lender status.
The rate actually imposed would then presumably be usurious (under the
rate limitations otherwise applicable to banks), and federal sanctions could
be imposed. Another view would stress that the federal law imposes pen-
alties only for an excessive rate, and that for violations of other aspects of
state law the borrower's remedy is a state law remedy. This view necessar-
ily implies that the federal sanction for misuse of most favored lender sta-
tus is not exclusive, contrary to the theme of the court holdings under
sections 85 and 86 of the National Bank Act.12 1 Nonetheless, this latter
approach seems a more reasonable accommodation of federal and state
interests.
C Can Rates be Exported?
The Supreme Court, in its 1978 decision in Marquette National Bank v.
First of Omaha Service Corp. ,u2 held that the language of section 85, iden-
tical to that of DIDMCA, allows national banks to charge the higher inter-
est rate permitted in the state where the bank is located for unpaid
balances on accounts of out-of-state credit card holders. Just prior to this
decision, both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits had also held that national
banks could export favorable interest rates for credit card transactions to
customers in other states, even though those rates were not permitted for
lenders located in those other states.' 23 The Supreme Court of Iowa, how-
ever, had reached a different conclusion. 124 The Iowa court drew a distinc-
119. Helms v. First Ala. Bank, N.A., 386 So. 2d 450 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980) (bank "cured"
§ 85 violation, thus avoiding any separate state penalty).
120. See note 107 supra.
121. See notes 13-21 supra.
122. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
123. Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, 548 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1977); Fisher v. First
Nat'l Bank of Chi., 538 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1976). Both circuits upheld the practice of na-
tional banks located outside Iowa charging out-of-state rates on open-end credit accounts
for Iowa customers.
124. Turner v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 269 N.W.2d 409 (Iowa 1978). The Iowa
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tion between intrastate and interstate transactions and found that "the
effect of [applying] 12 U.S.C., section 85, to interstate credit transactions is
an unwarranted extension of the 'most favored lender status."' 125 In Mar-
quette, the Minnesota Supreme Court was inclined to uphold the lower
Minnesota rate laws against the incursions of the Nebraska card issuer but
chose instead to follow the two federal courts of appeal. 126 The United
States Supreme Court then confronted the question of whether section 85
"authorizes a national bank based in one State to charge its out-of-state
credit-card customers an interest rate on unpaid balances allowed by its
home State, when that rate is greater than that permitted by the State of
the bank's nonresident customers.'
' 27
The Court focused on the first clause of section 85 and held that federal
law permits a national bank, "on any loan," to charge interest at the rate
allowed by the state laws where the bank is "located."' 28 In other words,
the laws of the state of location determine the interest rate for all loans by
that bank. Presumably DIDMCA, by using language identical to section
85, also allows federally insured depository institutions to export most fa-
vored lender rates for out-of-state customers.
An examination of the effect of the Marquette holding indicates that it
was an unnecessary and probably unwise extension of the most favored
lender doctrine. 129 Permission to export higher rates from one state to an-
other gives competitive advantages to "exporting" lenders beyond those
available to the most favored lenders in other states. For example, if a
national bank may export the higher rate of its home state (State A) to a
second state (State B) where lenders, including other national banks, are
limited to a lower most favored lender rate, the exporting bank would en-
joy advantages over the most favored lender of State B as well as over
other national banks located there.
On the other hand, if Marquette's import is that a bank may charge only
rates permitted by the state where the bank is physically located, national
banks located in State B, with low interest rate limits, would also be at a
Supreme Court held that a national bank located in Nebraska could not charge interest on
credit card accounts held by Iowa customers in excess of the amount permitted under the
Iowa Consumer Credit Code.
125. Id. at 415 (emphasis in original).
126. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 262 N.W.2d 358, 365 (Minn.
1977).
127. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 310 (1978).
128. Id. at 308.
129. The pro and con of Marquette has been argued in detail elsewhere. Compare Roh-
ner, Marquette.- Bad Law and Worse Policy, J. RETAIL BANKING, June 1979, at 76, with
Schellie, Marquette.- A Sound Legal and Social Result, J. RETAIL BANKING, June 1979, at 85.
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disadvantage when making loans in State A, where rates are higher. That
conclusion was reached by a federal district court in Meadow Brook Na-
tional Bank v. Recile. 30 The court reasoned:
In such a situation the purpose of the statute-to put national
banks on an equal par with the state banks against which they
compete-is frustrated if the national banks are restricted to the
interest rate in the states where they are located. On the other
hand, we do not think Congress intended this provision to serve
as a haven for national banks which. . . charge interest on loans
made in other states in excess of that allowed by the laws of those
states. This, too, would frustrate the Congressional purpose of
equality between national and state banks regarding the interest
rate. 131
Meadow Brook National involved a suit by a national bank located in New
York to recover from the endorsers of a note made in Louisiana. The dis-
trict court held that Louisiana usury laws applied because section 85 only
governs the rate of interest for loans made in the state where the bank is
located: "Consequently, loans made in states other than the one where the
bank is located ought to be governed by the laws of the state where the
loan is made."' 32 Although the result reached in Meadow Brook National
appears logical, the case has never been followed.
No court has expressly held that a national bank is limited to its home
state rates if the states where the bank does business permit higher rates.
Both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have stated in dicta, that where there
is a difference between the maximum rate allowable in its home state
(State .4) and the maximum rate allowable in another state (State B), na-
tional banks in State A may charge the higher rate permitted by either
State.A or State B for credit extended in State B. 13 3 There are in fact two
separate grounds on which national banks can legitimately use the higher
bank rates of the state where its customers live. The "except" clause in
section 85134 could be read to allow such use by its reference to the "laws
130. 302 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. La. 1969).
131. Id. at 74.
132. Id. at 75.
133. Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, 548 F.2d 255, 258 (8th Cir. 1977); Fisher v.
First Nat'l Bank of Chi., 538 F.2d 1284, 1291 (7th Cir. 1976). In both cases the state of the
bank's location had the higher rate. See note 123 and accompanying text supra.
134. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added) (quoted in pertinent part at note
12 supra). After authorizing national banks to charge either at the highest rate permitted in
their state of location, or at 1% over the Federal Reserve discount rate, § 85 continues: "ex-
cept that where by the laws of any State a different rate is limited for banks organized under
State laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for associations organized or existing in any
such State under this chapter."
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of any state" where the bank is "existing." That is, a national bank is not
limited to the rates of the state where it is located if some other state's law
(applicable to the transaction because of the bank's operations there) per-
mits higher rates for state banks. A second, and stronger ground, is by
application of normal conflict of laws principles: if a state bank or small
loan company in State A could validly contract at the rate permitted in
State B for customers living there, a national bank in State A would have
the same privilege.' 35 This rationale would also apply to other lenders
under DIDMCA.
Particularly important to a discussion of exporting rates is the question
of which other provisions of the state's law apply in addition to the interest
rate provision. Should banks that export rates under Marquette have to
comply with nonrate consumer protection provisions of the other state's
law? Or should the state of the bank's location govern incidental items
such as balance assessment methods, methods for computing interest, and
service fees? Which state's law controls disclosure, security, default
charges, and the like? Should a bank, under the most favored lender doc-
trine, be permitted to select those provisions of each state's laws that are
most favorable in order to maximize the yield on out-of-state transactions?
Marquette reflects a narrow interpretation of section 85,136 and arguably
under either section 85, or DIDMCA, a bank with most favored lender
status could pick the combination of rate limitations and other require-
ments which would provide the greatest revenue. The clear result, how-
ever, would be superiority over, and not equality with, the most favored
lender both in the bank's home state and in the state where the bank's
customer resides.
There are several possible paths through the thicket created by the Mar-
quette holding. Taking the case at face value, even conceding that a na-
tional bank or other federally insured lender in Nebraska can charge
Nebraska small loan rates as well as Nebraska bank card rates to Minne-
sota customers (an issue not decided in the case), the Nebraska lender
should still be subject to all other Minnesota rules that normally apply to
the lender dealing with Minnesota customers.' 37 This would include, at a
135. Fitzgerald v. United Va. Bank of Roanoke, 139 Ga. App. 664, 229 S.E.2d 138
(1976). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 188, 203 (1971);
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 116 (Donald A. Melbye, Spec. Ass't for Cong. Affairs), [1978-
1979 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 85,191.
136. The thrust of the Court's opinion was that the Congress of 1864 was aware of an
interstate credit market and therefore must have intentionally written that national banks
could charge the rate of the state where they were "located." 439 U.S. at 314-18.
137. This follows from the limited scope of § 85 itself which addresses only the permissi-
ble rates national banks must charge. There is ample authority that, with respect to other
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minimum, disclosure, default and collection requirements. Since the Ne-
braska lender is relying on the rate law of Nebraska, the lender should also
be bound by all provisions of that law that materially affect the rate, in-
cluding balance assessment methods, closing costs, service charges, and re-
bate requirements.
A better approach, suggested elsewhere, 3 ' would be to overrule Mar-
quette, legislatively if necessary. No Nebraska lender (except a national
bank at the time, and other federally insured institutions now under
DIDMCA) could rely on section 85 in dealing with Minnesota customers.
Therefore, by application of the terms of the Minnesota rate statute and
normal conflict of laws principles, no such Nebraska lender was favored
with the right to charge Nebraska rates in Minnesota. If section 85 seeks
parity between national banks and the "most favored" Nebraska lender,
then the Court in Marquette should have limited the Nebraska national
bank to the same rate ceiling that other Nebraska creditors would have
confronted in Minnesota.
A third path would be to redefine where a bank is "located" to include
all those locations where the bank does business. This interpetation would
prevent the inequitable exporting of rates from one state to another. For
example, while a federally insured bank located in State 4 could charge
the state's most favored lender rate for customers in that state, when it did
business with customers in State B it would be limited to the most favored
lender rate for that state. This construction meets the congressional intent
of providing equality with the most favored lender in each state without
giving out-of-state lenders "an unconscionable and destructive advan-
tage."' 39 DIDMCA states that federally insured depository institutions
may charge interest on "any loan . . . at the rate allowed by the laws of
the State. . .where the finstitution] is located. . . .",'I In Marquette, the
Supreme Court interpreted the term "located" in section 85 by reference to
transactional matters, state law governs national banks. See, e.g., McClellan v. Chipman,
164 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1896). This would include state conflict of laws rules which, in the text
example, would call for application of Minnesota law on non-rate aspects of the transaction.
Shanks, supra note 51, at 489 n.l 1. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 116, upra note 135.
The Comptroller of the Currency has generally acknowledged the applicability of state con-
sumer protection laws. See, e.g., Letter from John E. Shockey, Acting Chief Counsel, Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, to Charles E. White, Regional Counsel (July 14, 1976).
138. Rohner, supra note 129.
139. Turner v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 269 N.W.2d 409, 415 (Iowa 1978). The Iowa
court refused to permit the Nebraska national bank to use Nebraska rates for its Iowa card-
holders. On appeal to the Supreme Court, this decision was vacated and remanded in light
of Marquette, and the Iowa court subsequently held that Nebraska rates could be exported
into Iowa. Turner v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 281 N.W.2d 452 (Iowa 1979).
140. Equivalent language appears in §§ 521, 522, & 523. See note 8 supra.
[Vol. 31:1
1981] "Most Favored Lender" Doctrine
the legislative history of the National Bank Act, in which it was assumed
"that a national bank was 'located' for purposes of [section 85] in the State
named in its organization certificate."' 41 And in Fisher v. First National
Bank of Chicago,42 the Seventh Circuit found "located" synonomous with
"established," and held that "located" under the venue provision of the
National Bank Act 4 a was the principal place of business for the bank.
While these definitions of a bank's "location" enjoy judicial support, they
are thin reeds in the current reality of interstate banking, and could readily
be the subject of judicial rethinking or legislative correction."
IV. THE "1% OVER DISCOUNT RATE" OPTION
Both section 85, as amended in 1933, and DIDMCA provide another
interest rate option in addition to the rate permitted to the most favored
lender under state law. That option is "1 per centum in excess of the dis-
count rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve
Bank" for that district.'45 The legislative history of DIDMCA refers ex-
clusively to this option" as the advantage enjoyed by national banks
141. 439 U.S. at 310.
142. 538 F.2d at 1286.
143. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1976).
144. The Supreme Court itself has already relaxed somewhat the test for where a na-
tional bank is located for venue purposes. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. Bougas, 434
U.S. 35 (1977) (bank is "located" either at the principal place of business designated in its
charter, or wherever it has branch offices).
145. The pertinent statutory text is set out in notes 8 & 12 supra. According to one court,
§ 85 was amended in 1933 in order
to permit national banks to charge interest at a rate of 1% in excess of the discount
rate on 90-day commercial paper in effect in the district Federal Reserve Bank.
The amendment is phrased in the disjunctive, giving national banks the privilege
of charging 'whichever may be the greater' between the state usury limit on the one
hand, and a rate of 1% in excess of the 90-day commercial paper rate on the other.
First Nat'l Bank of Kansas City v. Estate of Ward (Est. No. 121,864, P. Ct. of Jackson
County, Mo., Jan. 20, 1976), reprinted in 93 BANKINo L.J. 593, 597 (1976). The FDIC has
interpreted DIDMCA § 521 to allow federally insured state banks to choose between three
permissible rates: "1 percent over the discount rate, the highest rate allowed to any lender
under state law, or the rate specifically prescribed for state banks under state law, whichever
of the three is greatest." FDIC Interpretive Letter, supra note 22, at 4.
146. The only mention of §§ 521-523 (in their final form) in the legislative history is the
following reference in the House conference report:
State usury ceilings on all loans made by Federally insured depository institutions
.. . will be permanently preempted subject to the right of affected states to over-
ride at any time and a ceiling of I percentage point above the appropriate Federal
Reserve discount rate will apply, except to transactions subject to the preemptions of
usury ceilings on mortgage loans and on business and agricultural loans. ...
H. CONF. REP. No. 842, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 79-80 (1980), reprinted in [19801 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 236, 308-09 (emphasis added).
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which DIDMCA was designed to extend to all federally insured deposi-
tory institutions. A congressional sponsor likewise pointed to the 1% op-
tion as the basis for national bank favoritism: "National banks have been
able to charge 1 percent over the Federal discount rate on all loans since
1933. State banks and all savings and loans have been at a distinct com-
petitive disadvantage with national banks during this period of exorbitant
interest rates."'
147
During a time of high interest rates, the discount-rate-plus-one may well
be the most favorable rate. When the discount rate falls below the rates
allowed any lenders in the state, the most favored lender doctrine under
section 85 and DIDMCA operates to maintain a rate for federally insured
institutions at least as high as the highest rate allowed by state law. As a
practical matter, then, the most favored lender doctrine is useful only
when the discount rate falls below the interest rates allowed to some lend-
ers under state law.
4. Relation to State Law "Most Favored Lender"
There is no case law construing the 1% above the discount rate option
under DIDMCA. Unofficial correspondence from the FHLBB,' 4s how-
ever, discusses the similar option under section 85 and provides an inter-
esting analysis of how generous the federal preemptions in DIDMCA may
be. Interpreting section 522 of DIDMCA, the FHLBB staff addressed a
Tennessee law that permitted a rate of 6% add-on or discount for home
improvement loans made by savings associations, and provided for a max-
imum effective rate of 18%. Other lenders could charge up to 18% simple
interest on any loan. The FHLBB staff first concluded that under
DIDMCA's most favored lender concept, savings institutions could charge
up to 18% simple-interest on home improvement loans. The staff then
went on to discuss the 1% option under DIDMCA, and noted that this
option was triggered when the 6% add-on rate "permitted" for savings and
loans under state law would yield less than 1% above the current discount
rate. Citing Ttjany,149 the letter interpreted the rate "allowed" to mean
the rate allowed the most favored lender in the state (18%), as distin-
guished from the rate permitted to savings and loans (6% add-on). This
interpretation was believed necessary to give meaning to the phrase
"whichever is greater." In other words, where the rate permitted savings
147. Remarks of Sen. Bumpers, 126 CONG. REC. S3177 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1980).
148. FHLBB Interpretive Letter from Milan C. Miskovsky, General Counsel (Sept. 29,
1980).
149. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1874).
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and loans under state law is less than 1% above the discount rate, savings
and loans can charge either the 1% option or the higher rate allowed an-
other lender in the state, whichever is greater. For example, in Tennessee,
6% add-on will be less than 1% above the discount rate option (say 14%)
for short term installment loans.'50 In such a case, the savings and loan
could charge 14% or even 18% simple interest, instead of 6% add-on.
An obvious question is whether the 1% above discount rate is limited to
a simple annual rate. Under the analysis suggested above, the answer is
yes, as long as the resulting figure exceeds the most favored state effective
rate of 18%. Surprisingly, however, the FHLBB staff concluded that the
savings and loan could compute 1% over discount as an add-on under
DIDMCA. While recognizing that the Act "does not specify whether the
reference to one point over the ninety-day discount rate represents a sim-
ple interest, add-on or discount ceiling," the FHLBB's opinion letter cites
Evans' 5  and Northway Lanes 5 2 as construing section 85 to approve
charging "add-on or discount in advance at the federal ceiling rate con-
tained in that section."' 153 Moreover, the FHLBB letter went on to note
that the most favored lender rate under state law options in the DIDMCA
would "probably not authorize" savings and loans to charge 18% add-on
where the state's most favored lender was limited to 18% simple interest.
The FHLBB's reliance on Evans, as well as the reliance of the court in
Northway Lanes, seems misplaced. The Evans decision came prior to
1933, when the 1% option was first put into the National Bank Act. The
Court in Evans granted permission to discount interest in advance as an
aspect of the most favored lender option where the controlling rate is set
by state law.' 54 Other courts have criticized Evans in light of the changed
practices of the banking industry, especially in installment lending, which
makes Evans unpersuasive even when institutions exercise the most fa-
vored lender option.5'5 In addition, the legislative history of DIDMCA
150. For example, $6 interest added to a $100 principal, and scheduled to be paid in 12
monthly installments of $8.83 each, produces a "simple-interest" rate of 10.90%. For shorter
periods, the simple-interest equivalent of 6% add-on is even less.
151. 251 U.S. 108 (1919).
152. 464 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1972).
153. FHLBB Interpretive Letter, supra note 148, at 3.
154. 251 U.S. at 114.
155. Eg., the Eighth Circuit in Nowlin, 509 F.2d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 1975), questioned the
soundness of the six to three decision in Evans and declared that:
The rationale of Evans, based on the long standing mercantile practice of discount-
ing short-term single payment commercial paper, should not now be extended to
permit usurious discounting practices on installment notes ....
Installment credit as it is extended and utilized today was for all practical pur-
poses nonexistent at the time of Evans.
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contains no indication that Congress intended the 1% option to be calcu-
lated as an add-on or discount. In a letter objecting to the FHLBB opin-
ion, the Office of the Commissioner of Banking for Wisconsin argued:
There is not a shred of evidence in the legislative history to sup-
port the conclusion that the phrase 'one percentage point over the
federal discount rate' refers to an add on of [sic] discount
formula. The federal discount rate itself is not an add on or dis-
count rate. Surely if Congress had intended that a rate of 1 per-
cent above the federal discount rate were to be calculated on an
add on or discount basis it would have said so in the statute as
well as in the legislative history.
156
Although the legislative history of DIDMCA indicates Congress' desire
to equalize the positions of federally insured depository institutions and
national banks, Congress focused on the 1% option and did not evidence
any knowing extension of the broad court interpretations of the most fa-
vored lender doctrine in section 85 to other federally insured institutions
under DIDMCA. Similarly, in a response to the Wisconsin letter,'57 the
FHLBB recognized that recent court decisions reflect a criticism of the Ev-
ans decision and that the issue is controversial. Consequently, when the
FHLBB issued its official interpretation on most favored lender,'58 it re-
mained silent on computational questions and ignored the position ex-
pressed in the earlier staff letter. Whether this signals an outright reversal
of that position is uncertain.
Evans and its progeny should not be followed. Neither the 1% option
nor the most favored lender doctrine should be expanded to create an un-
warranted disparity between federally insured and other state lenders.
The two federal preemption options provide adequate rate relief and ought
See also Cohen v. District of Columbia Nat'l Bank, 382 F. Supp. 270, 283 (D.D.C. 1974),
where the court distinguished between an installment loan where periodic payments result in
a declining balance, and a single-payment loan where the interest is withheld from the pro-
ceeds and the principal is repaid at the end of the year. The court held that combining the
installment and discount features was usurious where the resultant charges exceeded the
amount permitted under state law without discounting. The Cohen court acknowledged that
Fleckner, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 338 (1823), and Evans, 251 U.S. 108 (1919), found "an excep-
tion to the strict application of usury statutes. . . for discount-type loans." 382 F. Supp. at
283. The court then went on to limit that exception: "[H]owever,. . . the Fleckner-Evans
exception is restricted to simple discount loans, and. . . combining discounting with any
other means of exacting interest cannot excuse that loan from usury where the total amount
of interest exacted exceeds that permitted by statute." Id. at 284.
156. Letter from Robert A. Patrick, General Counsel, Office of Comm'r of Banking of
Wis., to Senator William Proxmire (January 5, 1981).
157. Letter from John H. Dalton, Chairman, FHLBB, to Senator William Proxmire
(March 4, 1981).
158. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,987 (1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 570.11).
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to satisfy the intent of Congress to "level the playing field"' 59 for federally
insured lenders.
B. Possible Problems Under the 1% Option
It seems reasonable to conclude under the DIDMCA most favored
lender proyisions that a federally insured depository institution must
charge interest both at the rate allowed and in accordance with state provi-
sions affecting the rate. However, if the federally insured lender charges
interest under the 1% above discount rate option, an argument might be
made that the various state substantive consumer protection requirements,
such as permissible charges, or methods of computing interest and balance
assessment methods, are not applicable. The 1% above discount rate
formula is a rate allowed by federal law, not state law, whereas the most
favored lender rate is the rate allowed under and borrowed from state law.
Arguably, then, the federally authorized rate is totally preemptive.160 Un-
less the 1% option is designed to create a super-advantage for federally
insured lenders, the more reasonable interpretation would be that the fed-
eral rate of 1% above discount was intended only to give competitive relief
with regard to interest rate limits. Therefore the remaining provisions of
state law which would otherwise govern the transaction should continue to
apply, with regard to rate computations, types of credit offered, and other
substantive customer protections.
Federally insured lenders (other than national banks) may also face a
dilemma. The DIDMCA preemption of usury ceilings applies only in
those states that have not elected to override it.' 6 ' Where a federally in-
sured institution is located in a state which has not enacted legislation su-
perseding the federal preemption, the question may arise whether that
institution is free to export its most favored state rate, or a rate of 1% above
discount, to customers in states that have acted affirmatively to override
the federal preemption. Or, alternatively, if the home state of a federally
insured lender overrides the federal preemption, can the institution, when
dealing with customers in other states, ignore that action and charge higher
rates in those other states where the federal preemption enables lenders
159. See note 5 supra,
160. Such a view has been universally adopted by the courts with respect to the usury
penalty under § 86 of the National Bank Act: Le., the federal statutory remedy precludes
imposition of any state sanction. See notes 118-19 and accompanying text supra. The prob-
lem with construing the 1% above discount option as totally preemptive of state law is that it
creates a vacuum. Since § 85 speaks only of rates, national banks must rely on state contract
law, such as the Uniform Commercial Code, to create binding obligations, to perfect secur-
ity interests, to establish foreclosure and collection rights, and so forth.
161. See notes 32 & 33 supra.
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located there to do so? Obviously, by allowing states to override the fed-
eral preemption, Congress recognized that states may, for reasons of public
policy, wish to limit the amount of interest that can be charged to borrow-
ers in the state, or at least restrict the rate competition among lenders.
This congressional deference to the states is a significant policy factor in
evaluating a lender's claimed right to borrow rates from other jurisdic-
tions. One of the criticisms of Marquette is that it permits disruption of a
state's rate structure and creates competitive disadvantages for all local
lenders when out-of-state banks can impose their home state rates on local
consumers. This kind of economic jingoism is even more objectionable
when, with congressional blessing, a state has affirmatively chosen to re-
tain its own rates and competitive structure. It is doubtful whether Con-
gress foresaw or intended an extension of most favored lender doctrine for
other lenders, such as that created by Marquette for national banks.' 62
Courts should proceed carefully in such an area where Congress has not
given clear guidance. The DIDMCA usury preemptions came at a time
when state usury ceilings were at below-market levels for many lenders.
The Act offers the opportunity to reconsider and reset interest rate limits at
realistic levels, thus enhancing the competitive atmosphere for all lenders
who do business in the state. There is no evidence that Congress intended
to provide any benefits to federally insured lenders beyond competitive
equality with national banks when market rates exceed state usury
restrictions.
V. CURRENT LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
Since DIDMCA was passed, Congress has considered a number of legis-
lative proposals to amend the 1980 Act. Two of those initiatives are cur-
rently under consideration by the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs Committee: S. 963,163 a bill which would authorize a federal inter-
est rate of 1% above the discount rate for any lender on any loan, and
S. 1406,64 a bill which preempts all usury limits for consumer credit.
S. 963 is a limited, temporary preemption designed to provide interest
162. Although the Marquette decision was handed down on Dec. 18, 1978, there is no
acknowledgement of it in the legislative history of DIDMCA, through and including the
President's signing of Pub. L. No. 96-221 on Mar. 31, 1980.
163. S. 963, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S3789 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1981).
164. S. 1406, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 Cong. Rec. S6627 (daily ed. June 22, 1981); rein-
troduced as Title IV of S. 1720, 127 CONG. REC. S 11,265-66 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1981). Hear-
ings on S. 1720 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 20-22, 27-30, 1981). See Wash. Cred. Letter (Oct. 19, 1981).
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rate relief to lenders who were not covered by DIDMCA in 1980.165 The
bill would amend Title V of DIDMCA by adding a new section that per-
mits a "person" to charge for "any loan. . . interest at a rate of not more
than one per centum in excess of the discount rate, including any
surcharge thereon, on ninety-day commercial paper."' 66 This provides to
all creditors virtually the same federal interest rate option now available to
federally insured depository institutions under Part C of Title V of
DIDMCA. The penalties for exceeding the federal rate under S. 963 are
identical to those in DIDMCA.'67 Although the preemption is universal,
it is only temporary and would expire on April 1, 1983, or whenever a state
steps in to override it and reimpose usury limits.' 68 This proposed legisla-
tion does not contain any language which indicates, nor does its brief legis-
lative history suggest, any intention to extend or clarify the most favored
lender doctrine under DIDMCA. The passage of temporary legislation
such as this, which also allows states to override the preemption, serves a
purpose by putting pressure on states to enact comprehensive legislation to
raise rate ceilings to realistically competitive levels.
S. 1406, jointly sponsored by the unlikely team of Senators Garn,
Proxmire, D'Amato, and Lugar, represents broader legislation in its pre-
emption of state usury limits, but, unlike S. 963, it does not cover all kinds
of credit. S. 1406, titled the Credit Deregulation and Availability Act of
1981, would make permanent the preemptions for agricultural and busi-
ness credit, and would add new sections to eliminate all state rate ceilings
for consumer credit.' 69 A similar bill has been introduced in the House
(and was the subject of recent congressional hearings), but that bill has
gathered less support and originally generated little activity.' 70 Both the
165. When S. 963 was introduced, Senators Bumper and Pryor (both from Arkansas,
where there is a constitutional usury limit of 10%) expressed particular concern for automo-
bile dealers and other retailers not covered by DIDMCA. 127 CONG. REC. S3789-92 (daily
ed. Apr. 9, 1981).
166. S. 963, supra note 163, § 53 1(a).
167. See note 112 supra.
168. S. 963, supra note 163, § 53 1(b).
169. S. 1406 would amend Title V of DIDMCA by adding a new Part D entitled Con-
sumer Credit. The proposed § 531 of that Part reads:
The provisions of the constitution or laws of any State prohibiting, restricting, or in
any way limiting the rate, nature, type, amount of, or the manner of calculating or
providing or contracting for covered charges that may be charged, taken, received
or reserved shall not apply to an extension of consumer credit made by a creditor.
S. 1406, supra note 164, § 531.
170. H.R. 2501, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), 127 CONG. REC. H937-38 (daily ed. Mar. 12,
1981). H.R. 2501 was introduced by Congressman LaFalce. Hearings on H.R. 2501 Before
the Consumer Affairs SubcomnL of the House Comm on Banking, Financial and Urban Af-
fairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 20, 1981). See Wash, Cred. Letter (Oct. 26, 1981). The
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House and Senate bills are designed to make more credit available to
consumers by giving lenders incentives to offer that type of credit.17' In
the Senate bill, S. 1406, those incentives include total preemption of re-
strictions on "covered charges" such as interest, points, annual fees, and
service charges.'72 The preemption would be permanent unless a state
elects to override it within three years of the effective date of the Act. 1
73
There is no penalty provision since there are no limits to exceed. The bill
leaves in place all state-law consumer protections except those affecting
rates and charges.174 Under this proposed law, most favored lender status
would become largely meaningless for consumer credit because every per-
son would be a favored lender, entitled to charge whatever the traffic will
bear.
The pending S. 1406 may offer the only realistic solution to the dilemma
of unfair advantages enjoyed by some lenders under DIDMCA. As long as
states can opt out of the federal preemption and restore their own rate
structures, though, all of the issues discussed above remain problematic for
lenders operating in those states. Furthermore, the bill unfortunately does
not address the problems created by expansive court interpretations of the
most favored lender doctrine under section 85 of the National Bank Act.
Even if states override the federal preemption of this bill and the 1980
DIDMCA, there is no provision in the National Bank Act allowing states
to override that Act's federal usury preemptions for national banks.
In addition, questions still remain concerning which state law provisions
determine interest and which consumer protections are not displaced.
S. 1406 defines "covered charges" but does not identify clearly which state
LaFalce bill contains a similar federal preemption for consumer credit. It does not, how-
ever, have the support of chief banking committee members. Testimony of Rep. John
LaFalce, in Hearings on S. 963 and S. 1406, Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong, 1st Sess. (July 9, 1981).
171. 127 CONG. REC. H937 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1981) (remarks of Rep. LaFalce); 127
CONG. REC. S6626 (daily ed. June 22, 1981) (remarks of Sen. Lugar).
172. S. 1406, supra note 164, § 532(a).
173. Id. § 533(b)(1).
174. Id. § 532(a)(1). The section-by-section analysis explains:
The provision [defining preempted charges] does not extend to state consumer pro-
tection laws that deal with restrictions, limitations or prohibitions against certain
types of creditor activity, which are unrelated to enumerated charges assessed in
connection with credit transactions. That is true even if the state provision only
applies to specific transactions that may be partially defined by the level or type of
charges being assessed. For example, a state law providing that credit transactions
with an interest rate in excess of 18% cannot be secured by real estate or a law that
limits attorneys fees in those transactions would continue to apply.
127 CONG. REC. S6628 (daily ed., June 22, 1981).
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law provisions are unaffected as consumer protections.' 75
VI. CONCLUSION
No one seriously disputes that Congress acted with justification in pro-
viding usury relief for federally insured depository institutions under
DIDMCA. Congress, however, acted as a firefighter, trying to resolve an
immediate emergency without clearly understanding, or projecting, the
guidance or precautions necessary to avoid future problems. Congress
should have specified that permission to charge 1% above the discount rate
does not authorize use of add-on or discount computations of that rate. In
addition, most favored lender status should not extend beyond the advan-
tages the entire state law allows for other lenders at a particular rate. In
making those positions explicit, Congress could have avoided an implicit
adoption of the case law under section 85 which has led to unwarranted
superiority for federal lenders.
The federal preemption of all consumer credit rate ceilings proposed in
S. 1406 should encourage states to write reasonable usury laws with appro-
priate consumer protections and will promote competitive equality for all
lenders in the meantime. As S. 1406 moves toward passage, the addition
of language clarifying which provisions of state law are considered con-
sumer protections would be helpful. Obviously, this will not cure the
problems created by unwise extension of the most favored lender doctrine
under section 85 of the National Bank Act in cases like Evans and Mar-
quette. While it may be unrealistic to expect Congress to amend the Na-
tional Bank Act to allow states to override the federal preemptions created
to "protect" those federal instrumentalities, the basic protections afforded
175. The section-by-section analysis of S. 1406, supra note 164, is equivocal on which
state-law limitations are preempted and which are retained as consumer protections. It is
not clear, for example, whether a prohibition on the use of the Rule of 78s for calculating
rebates of unearned interest would be preempted as "interest, . . . charges or any other
compensation ... arising out of the credit agreement or transaction"- proposed by
§ 532(a)(l)(A)--or would be preserved as consumer protection.
The explanation of the House bill, H.R. 2501, on the other hand, elaborates on what
"consumer protections" would be affected:
[S]tate laws or regulations specifying that the Rule of 78's is an improper method
of computing a rebate upon prepayment of a precomputed loan would not be pre-
empted; laws limiting the prepayment penalties that may be imposed would not be
preempted; State laws providing for limited periodic increases on variable rate
loans would not be preempted, although a ceiling on the ultimate interest rate
would be preempted; laws specifying maximum late charges would not be pre-
empted; laws requiring specific disclosures or notices such as the use of plain Eng-
lish on default notices would not be preempted.
127 CONG. REC. H937 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1981) (section-by-section analysis).
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national banks through section 85, and other lenders through DIDMCA,
would not be adversely affected if Evans and Marquette were legislatively
overruled or qualified.' 76 Consistency-genuine parity-among lenders
operating in a state, in terms of interest rates as well as disclosures and
other consumer protections, would enhance the competitive atmosphere
which the DIDMCA was designed to improve.
Unless the courts begin to take a more restrictive view of most favored
lender status, or unless Congress uses the pending usury preemption bills
as a vehicle to clarify the doctrine under DIDMCA, a most ironic scenario
is possible. Each of the preemption rules in DIDMCA, and the pending
ones in S. 1406 and H.R. 2501, includes a state-override provision-a nec-
essary political gesture to the states' rights advocates.' 77 If a broad most
favored lender rule emerges from DIDMCA (through agency interpreta-
tions or case law such as Equitable Trust), state after state may opt out of
the federal legislation precisely to avoid what may be seen as unwarranted
federal disruption of the competitive balance among financial institutions
in the state. In such a case, the whole congressional exercise would have
been futile.
176. In Marquette, the Supreme Court concluded its interpretation of § 85, permitting
national banks to export home-state rates, by suggesting that "any plea to alter § 85 ... is
better addressed to the wisdom of Congress than to the judgment of this Court." 439 U.S. at
319.
177. In floor statements accompanying the introduction of S. 1406, both Senator Lugar
and Senator Garn stressed the importance of the state-override mechanism. 127 CONG.
REC. S6626, S6630 (daily ed. June 22, 1981).
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